U.S. Business in foreign countries (a study in growth and problems), 1966 by Choudhury, Pravat K. (Author)
A
U.S. BUSINESS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(A STUDY IN GROWTH AND PROBLEMS).
A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY IN
PARTIAL FULFILDIENT OP THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF
MASTERS OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
BY
PRAVAT K. CHOUDHURY








LIST OF TABLES iv
LIST OF FIGURES v
ChapterI.NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 1II.THE GROWTH AND DE7EL0PMENT OF U.S.
BUSINESS ABROAD 7III.THE GOVERN14ENTAL ROLE I:
ENVIRONMENTAL AND FINANCIAL 33IV.THE GOVERNMENTAL ROLE II:
INVESTMENT GUARANTEE 53V.MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S.




THE LATE JOHN F. KENNEDY
FCRl-ffiR PRESIDENT OP THE UNITED STATES
In token of oqt personal regards and affection
ACeOWLEDGM^NTS
A stid«nt is aXuajs indebted to the teachers in his life.
This indebtedness is unquestionable and irredeemable. There can be no
greater pleasure for a student than to acknowledge this indebtedness.
I take pleasure at this opportunity, therefore, of expressing
Gqy life-long indebtedness to my teachers, without whose help it would
have been impossible for me to rise to this academic level.
To Dr. E. K. Das, Professor, School of Business Administration,
and my adviser, goes my sincerest regards and deepest gratitude for his
valuable time, stq>erb guidance and intellectual stimulation, which con¬
tributed greatly to the design and coopletion of this study. I am also
gratefni to Mrs. Das for her unending encouragement, timely help, and care,
at all times during my work on this study.
I am especially Indebted to Dr. Harding B. Young, Dean, School
of Business Administration, for the constant guidance and confidence he
bestowed on me from the beginning of my stay in the School, which gave
ms the incentive to develop my self confidence and the desire to work
hard — and for the inspiration. All these things will remain sweet
memories for the rest of my life.
I extend to the learned faculty of the School of Business Admin¬
istration, Atlanta University my sincerest thanks for they have been
a source of encouragement to me.
I tender wy thanks to Miss Norah M(^iven, who rendered her





1. Total Direct Investment Abroad in Different
Industries, 1950-1966 11
2. The Total Direct Investments Abroad in Different
Countries, 1950-1966 17
3* Geographic Distribution of Affiliates Abroad of
115 Corporations, biy Operation and Relation,
1958- 1959 23
4* Ownership Characteristics of U.S. Businesses Abroad,
July, I960 - December, 1965 (2,318 U.S.
Companies) 25
5. New Foreign Business Activity, July, I960 -
December, 1965 27
6. Location of Now Activity, July, I96O -
December, 1965 28
7. New Foreign Activity by Industry, July, I960 -
December, 1965 29
8. Distribution of Motives to Invest Abroad,
Reported by 72 coR5)anies, 1959 •. 31
9. Cumulative Value of Specific Risk Investment
Guarantees Given under U.S.Aid Programs 6l
10a. Preference and Practice as to Ownership of
Foreign Conqsanies, reported by 72 U.S.
Corporations, 1959 83
10b. Distribution of 84 Foreign Affiliates of 72 U.S.
Corporations, by Ownership of Voting Stock
and Outstanding Debt 83
lla. U.S.Business Operations Overseas — Sources of
Funds 87





1. Direct Investment Abroad in Industries 12
2. Direct Investment Abroad in Countries 14
3. Aid-Financed Exports, 1959 •‘ 1963 43
V
CHAPTER I
NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY
Introdnctlon.
EcoBomicallj speaking, ever since the United States of America
emerged as a creditor country, American businessmen have become increasing¬
ly involved in business operations abroad. Although beginning in trade
and commerce, the involvement has been more and more in the area of man¬
ufacturing and indi;istry in other countries. Indeed the mid-twentieth
century is perhaps witnessing an almost global expansion of American cor¬
porations. It is no wonder, that Business WeekV has this to says "U.S.
executives stand firm in their determination to turn their companies into
truly global operations.”^
It is interesting to mention here that a McGraw Hill Economics
Department Siurvey, made in July, 1965 shows that U.S.manufacturing and oil
companies planned to invest $5*4 billion in overseas facilities during
the year 1965* In fact, this increase was estimated to be the greatest
year-to-year increase since 1957. The sai^ survey indicated further that
the companies under study had enough projects on their books to indicate
another 7 percent increase in 1966.
It need hardly be added that the business operations referred to
here, oon^rise what has come to be called direct as opposed to portfolio
investment. Involving the setting up of and/or expanding business enter-
prises in foreign countries under American ownership, wholly or partly.
^ Business Week. August 7, 1965> p.26.
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CemceraiBg this developnent of the tiraea, three poixitg my be
aentloned briefly. One is the foreignness of the environment of these
business entei^prises and the manner of their operation. Indeed, the
way they operate "at any time not necessarily coinciding with the then
current policy of the United States govexurnent," and often working "under
pressure from political groups within the country (of operation) to align
themselves with one or another of them" is what Berle considers as one
important facet of the twentieth century capitalist revolution.
American enterprises doing business outside the U.S.necesseudly
have relations with their peers outside the U.S. and with
foreign governments which carry on major Economic functions.
No management can avoid them; no prudent management could fall
to have the equivalent of a dlplomatio staff
The second point is that the U.S.government, with its leading role
in helping the development of underdeveloped countries and its global
political commitment, is as much concerned with the growth of the U.S.
business abroad as are the American business executives.
The final point is that the business relationship between nations
constitutes the basic feature of "One World" of which Wendel Wilke spoke.
International business operations, in short, spanning different socio¬
economic environment and traversing political boundaries, constitute a
challenge to management in a way that business at home does not.
Given the phenomenal growth of the U.S.business abroad and the
points just made, the rationale of th^ study should be evid^t.
Scone of the Study.
While these developments — the growth of American business activity
abroad and the quasi-political role of the corporate management in this
^ Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Twentieth Century Canitallst Revolution
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964)* p.ll6.
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respect — are well known generally, and while anntaal data on bread changes
in American business overseas can be found in journals, no coB^rehensive
historical picture of American business in foreign countries is readily
available. In order to formulate a connected historical perspective of
this area of the business activities of the United States, one has to
work with different periodicals and collate data. This the author had
to do, which is a further rationale of the study.
Now to define the scope of the study. In order to keep the scope
under control, the study will try to develop answers to a few broad
questions. They are:
(1) What is the growth pattern of the U.S.business abroad,
especially since 1957?
(2) What has been, and is, the i«le of the federal government
in relation to the growth of the U.S.business in foreign
countries?
(3) How has the growth been financed ever the period under
study? Or, whs^t are the financial aspects of the U.S.
business operating abroad.
(4) What are the distinctive mamgement problems in operating
businesses abroad? Hew do the businesses aerating abroad
view them?
These questions provide the framework of the sttidy.
The field of international business is, by its very nature, extreme¬
ly conplicated. Accordingly, very many questions, especially la a miore
pinpointed manner, could well be raised. But considering the difficulty
in collecting data on such ether more definitive questions, and also con¬
sidering the fact that intemational business, as defined earlier, is a
developing field, the author is of the view that answers to the four
questions raised should provide the reader adequate views of the U.S.
international business operation.
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At this poittt, three poiats may be made to dellmeate the aature
of the study. First, the historical period covered ia this study is
from 1957 to 1965. For the period prior to 1957, a study the U.S.
Department of Commerce is available. There have been a few other studies
for the earlier period, although they do not fellow the same lines as
these to be taken by the author. Second, as already indicated, the
study will be in aggregates and will not be by vay of case studies of
specific business enterprises operating in particular countries. To
put it differently, the study takes a global view of the foreign activi¬
ties of American totezprises — total investments in different regions
and different lines of activities, such as manufacturing, mining, utilities
and so on. As far as the author has been able to ascertain, there are ns
published data available to permit a detailed breakdown of such broad cat¬
egories. Even if data were available, such data, however interesting or
instructive, would net provide a total view of the U.S.business abroad.
In ether words, some additive process must be resorted to if foreign
operations are to be appraised from the point of view of any one country.
Finally, no complete historical census of the U.S.businesses
operating abroad is presently available. Accordingly, the presentation
in this study will be based on sat^le data from various sources. In
other words, while the study will be representative of the U.S.business
aerations abroad, as far as it goes, it is but fair that the reader should
be warned at the outsat about the nature of some of the data on which
the study will rely. Mention may be made of the sample studies of the
McGraw Hill Company and of the firm of Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Manage¬
ment Consultants.
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Limitations and Validity of the Study.
From the foregoing, It should be clear that this Is not a coo^lete
history of the growth and devdepment of the U.S.buslness operating abroad.
It shooLd also be clear that It does not cover the exact size, nature,
scope and the management profile of the field \mits representing the U.S.
business abroad nor will all the facets of the overseas operations be
presented. For exao^le, the total business volumes In different sectors —
manufacturing, extractive Industries, public utilities, etc. — will not
be found in this study. This Is so because not all of the many readily
available Indicators of the activities of the businesses vlthln the
country are available in respect to their foreign operations. These
then are the limitations of the stu^.
Despite such limitations, the author takes the view that the study
gives a fairly representative and Intimate view of the tf.S*businesses
abroad, the financial aspects of their growth, the U.S.Government's role
in relation to the country's foreign business operations and the problems
for managements engaged In such operations.
Of the fact that the study emphasizes the period since 1957, It
may be mentioned that it Is only In the years following World War II that
the United States has become the undisputed vanguard of the free countries
of the world. And, it is from the 1950's that the American businesses
have been taking an interest la the emerging nations of the world, and
that U.S.business interests have tended to spread beyond Canada and Latin
America. This last point Is especially tx^le if one does not Include the
activities of the oil companies. The growth of new nations, the opportu¬
nities in the devdoping nations and the emergence of the European Economic
Union movement, more particularly of the Common Market, are all developments
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of the 1950*8. They are also the developments which have spurred American
private enterprise to look beyond the American continent. The governmental
preoccupation with helping the developing nations and with worldwide
defense pacts has led the govemtosmt to energize the private enterprise
of the country in the international sphere. All in all, the period covered
by the study would stand no con^rison with the earlier periods and, as
such, the eo^ihasls on the period since 1957 is not unwsurranted.
CHAPTER n
THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.BUSINESSES
ABROAD
The growth and development of business enterprises or activities
may be viewed in different ways* Briefly, it may be done in terms of
(1) the addition of real resources in the form of personnel, techniques
and capital assets of diverse kinds; (2) the types of operations involved;
such as manufacturing, assembling, extracting, selling and the like; (3)
the types of ownership-control, such as a subsidiary, associate, or
branch; and (4) the geographical location of the activities. Two further
facets of such growth and development may also be noted. One is whether
the development represents an altogether new activity or an expansion of
an existing one or something mere intangible, such as development through
licensing or franchising; a»i the other is the specific industrial sector,
such as iron and steel, oil etc., that the development represents.
Accordingly, any comprehensive study of the development of the U.S.busi¬
ness abroad should conprehend these facets.
Unfortunately, while the U.S.Department of Commerce has published
recently data on aggregate flow of direct private investment overseas,
there is very little official information on the number of separate oper¬
ations being conducted abroad, their location country by country, and
their ownership relation with U.S.businesses at home. In more recent
times, there have been a few indepehdobj^ studies made, by peims of
questionnaires and saaples, to supplement the official data. They en-
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deavor to throw light ea the differeat aspects of the development of the
overseas busiaess activities of the Uaited States. Stvidies hj Baymoad
F. Hlkesell of the Uaiverslty of Oregoa, Joha H. Duanlag, McGraw-Hill’s
Ecoaomlcs Divislea aad the firm of Booz, Allw aad Eamiltoa may be mea-’
tioaed ia this coaneetioa. It will be aecessary, therefore, ia what
follows, to develop a totail picture with the help of these other sources.
Growth of the P.3.Busiaess Abroad: Dollar Volume
To begia with, the growth aad develepmeat of the U.3.busiaess
operatiag la fereiga couatrles maj be seea ia dollar terms — dollar volume
of direct private capital lavesto^at ia fereiga busiaess operatioas.
This is obviously a conveaieat aad overall measure of such growth aad
develepmeat. For, the direct private capital iavestmeat abroad —* as
distiact f^em portfolio iavestmeat — represents, ia practice, aot Just
a flow of funds ffom the parent ergaaizatioa at hone to the affiliate abroad
but very much more. Mikesell points out:
It is much a»re than a flew of money capital; it iacluies
ceatributieas of tangible aad intangible assets ia a variety
of forms. Some of the resuureea are generated abroad from
retained earnings, depreciation reserves, aad local borrowings.
Nonmonetary transfers to the foreign affiliates include the
shipment of equipment, transfer of personnel, the provision of
managerial and technical assistance, aad the permission to use
intangible assets of the parent company, such as trade marks
aad patents .1
Under direct investment the foreign investor, therefore, not only
provides capital, but assumes control of the enterprise, aad/or partici*-
pates in its management also. Accordingly, the dollar volume of direct
private investment subsumes some of the characteristic features of the
promotion of enterprise or business activity, as mentioned earlier, and
may well be relied upon to give an aggregate view of the growth and
^ Raymond F. Mikesell, U.S.Private aad Government Investment
AbroadCUaiversit,v of Oregon Press, 1962), p.77.
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developmeat sf the U.S. businesees abroad. la ether words, the direct
investment, in the nature of things, dees involve entrepreneurial role
as distinct from purely investor role. In ether words, it does involve..
diir6cj| produetion-iBarketing risk-taking in contradistlactlen to financial
or speculative risk-taking in portfolio Investment decision-making.
It is necessary, however, to make it clear that direct foreign
investment does not necessarily carxy with it coB^lete or full ownership
of the enterprise or activity* Indeed, proportion of the ownership,
in practice, may range even as low as 10 to 25 percent, and in such a
case, the parent organization at home ordinarily would not exercise any
effective control but participate only in some of the important phases of
management. This ownership, in practice, may represent the remainder of
a one time full ownership or controlling position, or it may even represent
an equity Interest acquired in exchange for patents, technical know-how or
management services. In any case, the dollar volume of direct private
foreign investment would not bring out the ownership-control pattern of
the U.S. developments abroad in full measure.
In ether words, the dollar volumes would not directly reflect the
extent of the managerial-entrepreneurial role of the U.S.business abroad.
Subject to this proviso, the direct private capital investment is the
best aggregate measure of such growth*
Prior to 1929, direct investment was very small, mere so if invest¬
ment in manufacturing only is concerned. In 1929, the total direct in¬
vestment of the country stood at $7*5 billions (book value)* In 194^,
it was even less, namely |7*2 billions, and, in 1950, the figure was $11*8
billions. It is in the years since 1946 that the American foreign
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basiaess has shown its phenomenal growth. Mere particttlarly, while the
direct private capital investment in manufacturing, the best index of
foreign business growth, doubled between 1940 and 1950, it mere than
doubled hgain by 1957; and since 1957, it is expected to have increased
threefold by the end of 1966.
The trend of the country's direct investment abroad, in the aggregate
and in the major industrial sectors, is shown in Table 1. It will be seen
that during the last ten years the total American investment abroad has
been increasing at an annual rate of $3*3 billion. In this growth, two
major sectors contributed most — manufacturing, increasing at the rate of
$1.7 billion a year, while the corresponding rate for the petroleum,
historically the proverbial leader in the country's foreign business acti-
vi*^, was of the order of $1.2 billion.
The growth trend of American foreign business activity is also
depicted graphically in Figure 1. The different curves in the graph
shew clearly what has been said above. It is extremely interesting to
note how the curve for manxifacturlng takes a steep upward turn from 1956
to overtake the growth trend in petroleum. Equally interesting is the
fact that since 1962 manufacturing has come to constitute somewhere between
one third and one half of the total bixsiness investment abroad.
Let us new look at seme of the conponents of the growth of business
developments. During the period 1950-65, increase in manufacturing
investment abroad was nearly fivefold. What is important to note is
the increasing rate of investnent in manufacturing since the beginning
of the 1960*3. Most of the increase in manufacturing investments have
been in the developed countries, however, rather ithan in the underdeveloped
TABLE 1












1950 11.8 3.80 3.4 1.1 1.4 2.1
1956 22.17 7.15 7.28 2.40 1.7 3.64
1957 25.26 8.00 9.06 2.4 2.1 3.7
1958 27.25 8.70 9.80 2.5 2.1 4.15
1959 29.73 9.70 10.40 2.9 2.4 4.33
I960 32.77 11.10 10.90 3.0 2.5 5.27
1961 34.68 11.93 12.05 3.06 2.16 5.48
1962 37.U 13.20 12.60 3.1 2.23 6.01
1963 40.64 14.90 13.70 3.30 2.45 6.29
1964 44.34 16.86 U.35 3.60 2.02 7.51
1965+ 49.73 20.04 16.56 » *
1966+ 55.47 23.47 18.97 »
Source; Sttrvev of Current Business (Waabinetom. D.C»i U.S»Departnieat of
Commerce, 1956-65)•
^ Source; MoGraw-£lll Economics Department (expected figures).
* Figures for these areas have been Included In Manufacturing and
Petroleum; separate breakdown not available.
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U. S. Deportment of Commerce, Office of Butineu Economic* 60-9-7
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cotintrles. Despite the increasingly slow rate ef growth, the petroleum
industry continued to account for a fairly major portion ef foreign acti¬
vity by U.S. firms. Capital outlay in the petroleum industry was consid¬
erably lower in I960 in Latin America, more particularly in Venezuela, in
terras ef aggregate investment. The oil conpanies, however, stepped up
their esq^enditures on the plant and equipment since 1961, so as to make the
total investment stand at $13.70 billion in 1963 ~ still trailing behind
manufacturing.
Finally, it may be observed that for I966, petroleum affiliates have
scheduled for a moderate Increase in their capital outlays — for $2.7
billion in 1966 as against $2.4 billion in 1965« In any case, there is
clear evidence of a halting rate ef growth in the activities of the U.S.
petroleum coopsmies operating abroad.^ It may be interesting to note that
this is to be reasonably expected. In the first place, ef all the U.S.
businesses operating abroad, the oil coar.>anie3 have been very much under fire
in recent years and have had to accept increasingly stringent concession
terms, thus reducing the profit opportunities. In the second place, the
basic operation ef the oil companies is exploration and it may well be that
the oppoirtunities for exploration abroad is becoming increasingly difficult,
with the riskiness increasing at the same time.
Speaking ef the annual rate ef growth in total investment, it will
be observed that 1961 and I962 shew a sudden dip in the increasing growth
rate. What may be said in e^qplanation of this? As may be gathered from
the Survey of Current Business, this may well have been due to the slowing \q)
ef funds from the parent conpanies to the field units — this, in turn, being
^ Survey of Current Business (Washington, D.C.; U.S.Department of
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affected by the interest equalization tax of i^e Internal Revenue, emd
some apprehension about the exchange rate. Since 1962-63, there is evi¬
dence of resanption e£ an increasing rate of growth as may be seen from
Figure 2.
Business Expanaiem Future Outlook
What about the growth pattern of American business abroad la the
years ahead? Table 1 and Figure 1 include the projections for 1965-66
as estimated by the McGraw-Hill Economics Department on the basis of a field
suirvey. The survey, made in July, 1965^ shows that the H.S. manufacturing
and oil coD^>anies planned to invest $5*4 billion in overseas facilities
in 1965, a 14 peroaat gain ever the previous year — and the greatest year-
to-year rise since 1957, the year ©f the Suez crisis* The survey also
reports that for 1966, the companies have enough projects on their books
to show a further gain of 7 percent for the year.
Of the conpanles responding to McGraw-Hill’s survey, 14 percent
said that their overseas investment targets for 1965-66 are lower than
they would have been. Among these con^anies the cuts are substantial —
10 perc ent or more for 75 percent of those reporting cuts for 1965 and
SO percent of those planning cuts for 1966. The survey also indicates
that S6 percent of coopanies are pressing ahead with e3q)an3lon abroad,
at least as large as their original plans.
To sum up, the planned growth of the two years reported in the
McGraw-Hill Survey, including the finding that S6 percent of the reporting
conpanies propose to increase their planned investment, coupled with the
fact that ie the foreign investment of U.S. conpanies operating abroad
that has precipitated the recent balance of payments crisis of the country.
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weuld appear t® give a bright future for the developmeut ®f the U.S. busi¬
ness abroad.
Business Growth Abroad: Regiooal_Pattera
It is interesting to ask: ifhat are the regions where American
business ei^ansion has occurred over the period? For facility of analysis,
it is cenvenient to group the coimtries of the world into five regions.
This is also what many of the American companies do to facilitate their
managerial control. The grouping of countries into regions iS done on
some reasonable basis, of course. Canada and Latin America, partly because
of their proximity to the United States, and partly because of their much
closer economic ties with it than with the rest of the world, would consti¬
tute the two important regions for the overseas operations of the American
business. In their turn, they are treated as separate regions because of
their different geography, culture and level of economic development.
Next in importance comes Europe, for obvious reasons. The Middle East and
Africa constitute not only one contiguous geographical ao'ea but also re¬
present almost the same level of economic development. The countries of
the world may be grouped, therefore, into five regions, each distinct from
all others.
Vhat, then, of the growth of the U.S. business in these areas?
The amswer is provided by Table 2 and Figure 2.
Preponderately larger investment in Canada throughout the period
stems from the economic relationship between the two neighboring countries.
Camada's attraction for the Americaun business stems from the many similau>-
ities of its culture and economy with these of the United States and Canada's
need to devel^ its own vast resources, mamy of which remain untouched.
TABLE 2
THE TOTAL DIRECT INVESTMENTS ABROAD IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
1950 - 1966
(Billion dollars)








1950 11.8 3.60 4.60 1.7 1.0 0,9
1956 22.17 7^6 7.46 3.52 1.10 2.63
1957 25.26 8.6 8.1 4.1 1.8 2*66
1958 27.25 9.3 8*4 4.5 1.9 3.15
1959 29.73 10.2 9.0 5,33 2.0 3.2
I960 32.77 11.2 9.1 6.6 2.5 3.37
1961 34.68 11.8 9.2 7.6 2.38 3.7
1962 37.U 12 .U 9.4 8.8 2.4 4.4
1963 40.64 13.06 9.88 10.35 . 2.70 4.65
1964 44.34 13.82 10.20 12.06 2.90 5.36
1965» 49.73 15.21 10.90 14.36 3.13 6.13
1966 55.47 na na na na na
Source: Survey ef Current Business (Waabiagtoa. D«C.t U.S.DepartmeBt ef
Commerce, 1956-I965).
* The figures fer the Middle East and other countries have been proportioned
as per assumed ration of 1964* McGraW'**Hlll Economics Department*
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Canada's favorable position uithin the British Commoavealth and import¬
antly, its growing demestio tsarket provide some of the enplanatlon. Even
more, in large measure, the two economies are complementary to each other.
U.S. direct investment in Canada advanced steadily, reaching
billion in 1957, about |1.2 billion increase over 1956, and $5.0
billion over the 1950 level. Further, this amount rose to $10.2 billion
in 1959) more than double from the 1950 level. Of the direct capital outlay
in this region, it may be mentioned that increase in investment la manu¬
facturing was about $1.0 billion annually between 1956 and I960. In
1957, the increase in outlay was ipich hl^er, but this only reflected
exceptionally large outlays by a few companies in the paper and pulp and
primary metal categories. It is no wonder that in 1959 and I960, the
U.S. direct Investment in Canada accounted for about 40 percent of the
total outlays in the manufacturing sector of Canada. Such then has been the
overwhelming ioipertance of the U.S. business operations in Canada — isport-
ant net only for the absolute growth, as depicted in Figure 2, but also for
the role that the U.S. capital Investoaent plaj^s in the Canadian economy.
CoD^ared to Canada, the growth of U.S. business activity in
Latin America is in sharp contrast, even though the latter region is defin¬
itely within the sphere of economic influence of the U.S. The region of
Latin America, despite its potential, does not reveal the same vigorous
expansion of U.S. business activity that has been noted in Canada. What
is even more, from the iaid-1950's, the region has lest its pre-eminence
as the venue of U.S. activity. On the one hand, Canada has moved up to
first place and on the other hand, the rate of growth up to the mid-1950's
slowed down considerably in the following years. Beth these aspects are
19
brought out whes we csn^iare the curvea ia Figure 2.
Between 1959 1961 there was practically no growth of buaiaeaa
activity in this area. Since 1962, there was evidence j»f some growth
of investment and business activity. It la interesting to note, that
this is largely accounted for by the growth of activities in countries
such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela, mostly in connection
with investments in mining operations.
What is the e:q>lanation for the pattern we observe? The answer
takes on a vaguely political nature. Despite U.S. efforts to embrace
the area under the Monroe Doctrine, the region being more or less a
part of the dollar area, the U.S. e:g>erlence with Cuba, experience of
e3q)repriatlen of some U.S. private investment, particularly in oil, the
vehement nationalism of the coimtries of the region and the political
instability of the area, are reasons which explain the trend of the
U.S. business activity in this area since 1955. At the same time,
newer opportunities for and problems of business in Canada and Europe
have, during this period, made increasing demands on the limited invis¬
ible dollars of the U.S. businesses operating abroad.
Overshadowing even the closest neighbor, Canada, is the marked
growth trend of the U.S. business expansion in Europe. From around an
Investment of $3.52 billion in 1956 the investment in Europe was estimated
to stand at $14.36 billion in 1965. What is remarkable of the develop¬
ment in this region is that beginning with a total capital investment of
half the size of investments in Canada in 1956, the investment in Eurhpe came
to be almost equal to that of Canada at the end of only a decade. What
a tremendous shift of eopbasis on the part of the U.S. businesses for
20
their eperatiens!
The majer netlve of the U.S. bustaesses ia loakiag this big shift
has perhaps beea the hauntiag fear the Uaited Kiagdem laight succeed
la eaterlag iate the Eurepeaa Geamoa Market (EGM). Appreheasioa ef
lesiag a large market, ia case Britaia should succeed ia Jelalag ECM,
the U.S. busiaess took the cautleaary step of eatreachiag itself ia Europe
ahead of time. It is aot merely this factor that cam explain this devel-
opmeat. The more potent factor has beea the anxiety of the U.S. business
enterprises operating ia Europe to find themselves inside ef the £(31
and/or the European 'Free Trade Area, known as the EFTA.
The presence ef the ceiomoa market has alse beea another pesitive factor
la encouraging investment ia manufacturing establishments within the
tariff walls ef the common market.
It nay be asked why this urge te be within the territories of
tihese organizations? The answer is simple. The logistics of these
economic unions, if we may so describe them, consist ef two elements.
One is the enlargemsat of the trading area that it connotes, and, as such,
providing opportunity for mass production. The other is the spirit of
exclusion of outsiders exenpllfled by the tariff wall around such unions.
Given these features, the only way the U.S. busiaess can safeguard its
economic interests in these areas is by setting up its production units
within l^ese areas. This avoids the problem ef the tariff wall that new
tmdlag must face. The production units, operating with cheaper European
labor, and for larger market areas, must prove te be productively attract-
ive. No wonder that in recent years, U.S. corporations have rushed to
this measure in a large scale.
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It is iaterestlsg ts mete here, that, ia large measure, Americas
busiaess has come to be more laterested ia operating la the developed
countries. This is evident hj a coEaparisoa of the curves ia Figure 2.
More specifically, it nay be meatioaed that a considerable part of the
increase ia investment in the Middle East is accoxmted for by the explor¬
ation ia petroleufft and production. Furthermore, the other areas include
such countries as Japan and Australia. Therefore, despite the business
interest in underdeveloped countries, the actual investment seems to flow
ia developed rather than ia underdeveloped countries. For example, even
in 1963, when the capital flow from the United States to Europe was lover
than in previous years — capital flow being distinct from investment —
manufactuiring investment ia Eiarope alone increased by $0.65 blUlen, while
the increase in direct investment in all the underdeveloped countries in
the same year was $1.0 billion.^
To sum up, by far the most numerous business activities are manufac¬
turing and selling, as may be seen from Figures 1 and 2, and these are
located very heavily in the already industrialized areas such as Europe,
Japan, Canada and Latin America.
The C.S. Business Abroadt Operational Profile
What of the (Operational profile of these developments? To what
extent are they manufacturing establishments, or assembly operations or
seme ether kind? In what business relationships do they function —
as subsidiaries or affiliates or branches? How have these different
activities been regionally distributed? What of their ownership relation
to the TJ.S. business at home?
On these questions no year-to-year data seems available. However,
^ Survey of Current Business (Washington, D.C., U.S.Department of
Commerce, September, I965), p.23.
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the settle study ef 115 U.S. oerpsratlens made by the University of
OregsB relating te the year 195$-59, is fairly informative.^ The summary
findings ef the study are given in Table 3. The exhibit shows the nature
ef eperationsy their industrial segment ef these operatiens, their erganiza-
tienal form and their geographic distribution.
The sample study ef 115 cenpanies indicates that they have 1,124
manufacturing affiliates throughout the world (excluding Canada), cot^ris-
ing 49 percent of the total ef 2,301 overseas establishments covered by
the study. Of the total manufacturing coQ^anies 37 percent were in Latin
America. Europe and the British Commonwealth, each had mere than half
the humber ef manufacturing establishments in Latin America. The British
Commonwealth and continental Europe held 35 percent ef the manufacturing
affiliates. The less advanced countries on the ether hand accounted for
only a small number of U.S. manufacturing affiliates. Even assenobly
operations abroad, though net numerically significant, but perhaps important
in terms ef employment potential, are also concentrated in more industrial¬
ized coiuntrles. The san^le study also shews the location of selling and
trading organizations, con^rising 35 percent of the 115 coiipanles in the
saoq>le, and their distribution fellows closely that of the manufacturing
coapanles. The san^le clearly indicates that the most numerous foreign
business activities are manufacturing and selling and these are located
very heavily in industrialized areas of the world.
What of the operational profile of more recent years? One of the
facets of operation is organizational form, ownership and control. It
will be noticed that out ef the 1,124 coB^nies reporting, 907 were sub¬
sidiaries and 53 ward branches. These were the field units under the
^
Conducted by the University of Oregon in 1962.
TABLE 3
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF AFFILIATES ABROAD OF























Latin America 337 56 18 13 2 1 47 34 u 7 6 6 1 9
Europe 217 47 3 18 1 - 3 5 - - 4 - 3 1 -
British
Commonwealth 201 25 4 15 2 - 15 - - 6 3 - 2 - 6
Asia & Far East 46 25 2 2 1 - 2 1 3 3 5 - 1 - -
Middle East 6 5 1 2 - - - 2 - 13 2 - - - -
Africa 13 1 - - - - 6 3 2 10 4 - 1 - 1
Total
Distributed 820 159 28 50 6 1 73 45 19 39 24 - 13 2 16
Undistributed 87 30
Total reported 907 159 58 50 6 1 73 45* 19+ 39 24 - 13 2* 16+
Total by Categor-
iss
1,124 57 137 63 31
Source: Raymond F, Mikesell, U.S.Private and Government Investment Abroad.
University of Oregon Press, 1962, p.80-81.
* E3q)loration
^ Agriculture
S Subsidiaries, 51 percent or more voting stock owned by U.S. corporation
A Subsidiaries or associated companies, less than 51 percent of voting stock









B: 3 A B
133 - 53 22 3 8 600 74 96
120 17 28 5 7 - 368 76 35
71 U 45 10 3 - 312 53 57
27 10 13 4 1 85 45 16
U 5 8 3 1 - 27 26 9
33 4 U 1 - 1 58 19 17
398 50 161 45 15 9 U50 293 230
61 150 148 180
,459.,JO .3U 45 15 9 1598 293 410
840 69 2,301
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ooatrel ef the heme erganissatiem and management. It will be found that
ef this preponderant, regardless ef the nature ef the business operation —
mnnufaeturing, assemblj, extraction er selling or otherwise, as shown in
Table 3 ot the total of 2,301 foreign affiliates, seme 2,000 were organ¬
ized as subsidiaries er branches.
This pattern in respect ef organizational form, ownership and con¬
trol is equally evident in the historical perspective. A sao^le study of
the ownership pattern of new foreign establishments for the period 1961
to 1965 is shown in Table 4« In 1965, 64 percent of all the new estab¬
lishments created by U.S. companies in foreign lands were wholly owned by
the American cecpanies — this was also the figure in 1961. In the inter¬
vening years, the percentage did not fall below 60 percent. It is inter¬
esting to note that an attitude study ef 72 conpanies, as early as 1959,
indicated that a similar ownership control preference prevailed.^
Why this preference for ownership and control? Generally speaking,
the Investor would like to be assured ef the security of his investment
and to operate the enterprise according to his own judgment. It is ob¬
vious that without control optimal perforcoance and security cannot be
granted to the investor. At the same time, many foreign establishments
operate in an environment where local managerial skill and expertise would
not conpare favorably with that which the heme conpany Could offer —
not to mention that they nay net even be available in many of the under-
devel^ed countries. Under the circumstances, it is natural that the
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1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 :196l 1962 1963 1964 1965
Whellj U.S.
owned foreign
branch 63 11 34 74 74 73 115 22 5 4 544
Wholly owned




Interest 63 61 82 101 72 12 6 8 7 6 470
Minority-
financial
interest 63 52 62 57 58 10 3 4 4 3 343
Unknown-
interest 129 197 177 187 162 11 13 8 8 8 988
IndeterBin-
able 12 16 14 18 16 8 16 4 7 2 127
TOTAL 560 584 718 761 685 255 276 202 168 188 4,810
SoTiroe: New Foreign Business Activity of U.S»FlrtD3.(Booz. Allen & Haalltoa.
Ino,, New YerA), p.l?*
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The development of Joint venture vlU now be e^^lalned. In the
age of nations state, the underdeveloped countries are more particular
that the local resources participate in their own esonomlo development*
As an integral part of their developmental planning, they are also anxious
that the new enterprises spread the new skills required among their own
nationals. Under the circumstances, the American coopanles have often
coincided the demands of the host government with their plans, in order
to gain a business foothold in the country concerned. In the underdevelop¬
ed countries, the unrestricted entry of foreign businesses is a thing of
the past. In the more developed countries, such as Italy or France, a
different governmental consideration comes into play, which is the contingent
problem of balance of payments in the years to come, when the foreign enter¬
prises might ask for the repatriation of funds or earnings. From the
X>eint of view of the American corporations, the Interest in Joint owner¬
ship and control isay stem from the local currency needs in the operation
of the enterprise, and also perhaps to create goodwill in order to get a
good hold on the local market. Of these opposing considerations, the
latter being perhaps the less significant, unless it is it^osed upon by
the host government or in special cases of large currency needs. Accord¬
ingly, the data reveals a very small proportion of the foreign operations
under Joint ownership and control*
In Table 3, we indicated the nature of operations — manufacturing
vs. others. It is observed that the manufacturing constitutes the
largest proportion of the activities. Of the 2,301 ceii^}any affiliates,
1,124 are manxifacturing operations. The data relates to 1958-1959.
It is new necessary to ask what has been the pattern of business expansion
in this respect in recent years? Table 5 shews the data since the year
TABLE 5
HEW FOREIGN BUSINESS ACTIVITT
(JULT, I960 - DECEMBER, 1965)
Total igAi
1960-1965 1962 1963 1964 1965
New Establishments
Manufacturing 2,524 382 445 516 507 426
Non-Manufacturing 1,115 178 139 202 254 259
Escpansions
Manufacturing 914 185 176 159 155 171
Non-manufacturing 257 70 100 43 13 17
Licenses 1,566 340 247 304 282 259
TOTAL 6,376 1,155 1,107 1,224 1,211 1,132
Number of cen^anies reporting 703 697 745 738 704
Source: Hanagemeat Dlvlsiea, Beoz, AUeu & Hamlltou Inc., New 7oi;k.
1961, and the total of the entire period. Over the period I96I-I965,
the U.S. business eipanded activities by about 20 billion dollars, as Bay
be seen from Table 1. Over the same period, the number of establishments
representing this investment increased by 6,376. Relevant to another
aspect of the profile is <— where have these investments gone? Table
6 shows the location of new activities and the data shews the distribution
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TilBLE 6
LOCATION OF NEW ACTITITT
(JULY, i960 - DECEMBER, 1965)
Total
1960-1965 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Western Europe 3,187 597 559 597 598 554
Western Hemisphere 1,645 281 288 325 311 291
Asia 1,025 189 176 206 197 177
Africa 210 31 32 41 44 48
Oceania 309 57 52 55 61 62
TOTAL 6,376 1,155 1,107 1,224 1,211 1,132
Number of coiqpanies reporting 703 697 745 738 704
Source: Management Division, Beoz,Allen & Hamilton Inc., New York.
•f establiehments and the dollar ^mounts.
At this point it is interesting to make a passing observation,
assuming the nuoiber of coiqpanles reporting foreign development. It vill
appear that each new establishment including expansion represented an
average investment of roughly |3 billion for the five-year period.
Coming now to another side of the operational profile. It is inter¬
esting to ask what are the industries into which the investments in recent
years have gone? Exhibit 7 shews the Industry pattern of U.S. foreign
operation abroad for the period I96I-1965. It will bo noticed that
2B
TABLE 7
NEW FCEEIGN ACTI7ITT BT INDUSTRY
(JULY, I960 - DECEMBER, 1965).
Industrial eLass of Parent Total 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Farming 6 2 1 2 1
Mining 225 45 37 47 41 a
Construction 37 1 16 8 7 5
Food and Kindred products 401 90 61 56 71 73
Textiles U5 26 24 27 32 23
Apparel 139 26 24 26 31 19
Lumber and furniture 81 8 9 17 19 21
Paper and allied products 171 30 25 36 40 31
Printing and publishing 67 8 17 19 13 4
Chemicals & allied products 908 159 153 166 167 173
Petroleum 90 17 19 15 18 16
Rubber & Plastic products 153 37 22 26 26 27
Stone, ClsQT, Glass products U7 16 27 35 22 32
Primary metal products 294 52 47 72 62 41
Fabricated metal products 352 65 59 60 76 60
Machinery (except electrical) 81 151 152 174 132 119
Electrical Machinery 607 137 113 130 98 87
Transportation & equipment 488 82 84 88 98 80
Scientific Instruments 250 38 42 40 52 49
Misc. manufacturing
(including ordinance) 184 45 35 31 26 37
Wholesale-Retail trade 186 21 40 47 32 34
Finance-Insurance 323 44 41 60 73 94
Transportation & business 312 55 59 44 73 65
TOTAL 6,376 1,155 1,107 1,224 1,211 1,132
Soiircet Management Divlsiem, Beoz, Allen & Hamilton Inc., New York.
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aialag, food processing, chemicals and allied prodiiots, machiaery,
electrical and otherwise, constitute hy far the largest number ef establish¬
ments or expansions. In ether words, the capital intensive types of oper¬
ations seem to be the preferred line of activity.
Summing Up
In the foregoing pages an atteopt has been made to study the growth
and development of U.S. business activities abroad from different points
of view — dollar commitments, the regional distribution ef such invest¬
ment, the organizational pattern of operating the foreign activity, the
nature and extent of ownership and control of such business activities abroad,
and finally the types of industry segments that these industries represent,
An attempt was made to indicate some of the observed trends in respect of
these various facets of development.
In concluding the chapter, further points may be raised. Firstly,
what kind ef motivation generally ispells the U.S. businesses to go
abroad. Instead ef trying to trade by means ef export as best as the cir¬
cumstances permit? In answer to this question it id interesting to
observe that profit, holding on to the market, securing raw materials and
the opportunity for a sheltered existence in the selected foreign countries
eeustitute the most inportant set of motives. It is interesting to
refer here to the saople study made by Raymond F. Mikesell of 72 companies
in 1959, data from which is shown in Table 8.
The second point is a growing emphasis to turn to manufacturing
leather than other lines of activity, and to prefer the developed markets
ef Europe and Canada as opposed to the rest of the world. This particu¬
lar preference on the part of the U.S. enterprises abroad has been an
TABLE 8
DISTRIBUTION (F MOTIVES TO INVEST ABROAD,





Expanded foreign demand or market 19
Nationalism and foreign restrictions 14
To obtain raw materials 12
Lower costs abroad(laber and better technology) 7
Diversifications 5
Shortages of dollars for ioporta in host countiy 4
Maintain supplier relation with customer 4
Poor performance of local distributors 3
Necessity to adapt product to foreign demands 3
To protect patents by working them 2
To develop private enterprise abroad 2
To raise living standards abroad 1
To protect the U.S.market 1
Source: Raymond F. Mikesell, U.S.Private yid Government Investment Abroad
(University of Oregon Press, 19^)> P»d9«
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eletneat particularly aotlceable during the last ten-<year period. This
point is established vhen the growth pattern of manufacturing investments
and the investments in Europe and Canada during the same period are brought
together in one group, for the co-relation would appear veiy evident.
CHAPTER ni
THE GOVERNMENTAL ROLE Is ENVIRONMENTAL AND FINANCIAL
Intreductloa
Despite the grewth ef interaatlonal ecoaei^^ since World War II, the
verld is still made up of nation states and national economic autarchy.
Accordingly, the foreign bvisiness operation has to encounter the govera-
meat twice — first, the gs7emment of the host country Inasmuch as its
regulations and policies must necessarily provide the eavirenmeat of its
operation, and secondly, the regulations and policies of the home govern¬
ment inasmuch as its activities abroad must ii^lnga on the country's
international economic relationship in innumerable ways. In addition.
Industrially advanced coxiatries have generally taken upon themselves the
tai^ of helping the development of the underdeveloped countries — largely
through persuading its private enterprise to participate in this respect.
One may recall here the U.S. Government's effort to encourage private
enterprise to turn to business abroad and the various kinds of voluminous
foreign aid programs and international lending. In the nature of things,
these have provided considerably climate for foreign business operations.
For example, financial assistance at the governmental level from the United
States to many of the underdeveloped countries has often provided the
stage for growth and development of American private business abroad.
From the foregoing, it should be evident that the government is one
of the important factors in foreign operations in more ways than one.
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perhaps more vitally se in foreign operations than in operations at home.
It therefore beoeoas necessaiy to ask what role does the U.S. Government
play in determining the shape, the structure and the volume of the oountxy's
business operations abroad.
In this and the following chapter an atteiq>t will be made to delineate
the various roles the U.S. Government plays in helping the development
of the U.S. private business abroad.
U.S. Government’s Role: Basis of Approach
Following World War II, the U.S.Government has totally committed
Itself to the promotion of American business abroad to help the economic
development of underdeveloped nations. Not only has this led to merely
exercising moral suasion on the country's private enterprise, but In the
sequel, there has also developed a proliferation of governmental agencies to
look after the many facets of this bread task. Since 1961, most of these
agencies have been brought together under one central organization called
the Agency for International Development (AID), of which moxb will be said
later.
At this stage, it is interesting to ask how the government has been
viewing the problem of developing American business abroad. In what
manner has it been trying to create and foster the necesseuy climate for
it? Briefly speaking, three major points must be made in answer.
Firstly, through the totality of foreign aid to the underdeveloped countries,
in one fora or another one might even Include the Marshall Aid program
to Europe — and here the government has obviously been helping in the
build-up of the appropriate infrastructure for the country's private
enterprise operating abroad. Mudr of the U.S. economic foreign aid
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especially that at the geverntBeat-to-governneat level — has gene te
help the infrastructure ef the beneficiary countries; and such develop~
ment is basic te business development in such countries. Therefore, the
government role may be described as ene of the developing ef and providing
with the appropriate business climate. Eelping towards the same goal,
but mere specifically so, the U.S. Government often finances in conjunct ion
with private enterprise, what may be described as feasibility studies ef
specific business projects in paarticular countries, undertaken at the
request ef private enterprise interest in the project.
Secondly, the federal government., is vested with the authority to
lead to private enterprise funds te help the promotion of U.S. private
enterprise abroad. Indeed, in more ways than one, the U.S. Govexnmeat
is a source ef finance for the country's private enterprise operating
or about to enter into the foreign business operation.
Finally, the government provides security against various kinds of
business risks,characteristics ef international business operations, suck
as risks against expropriation ef investment and of repatriation of earn¬
ings ef operations from abroad.
Te sum up; helping to develop the infrastructure and economically
strategic industries of the countries abroad, and helping in the identifi¬
cation and feasibility ef foreign business projects under the investment
survey project, and providing loanable funds to private enterprise and
underwriting many of the non-business risks of foreign operations — in
these three major ways, the U.S. Government promotes U.S. business private
enterprise abroad.
It is now necessary to turn to a brief analysis of the details ef
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these geveraaestal roles aimed to help U.S. business operating abroad.
In the remainder of this chapter, the first tuo aspects of the governmental
role will be taken vip and la the following chapter, the third role will be
dealt with.
The U.S.Gevemmeat: Creating the Climate for Foreign Operation
In our times, the IJ.S. Gevernnent has several agencies far encouraging
U.S. private business and investment abroad. As already mentioned, these
agencies have now been brought under one central agency called AID. The
Agency for International Development was created by the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, to administer the foreign aid program of the United States.
This Act also merged the functions of the International Cooperation Admin¬
istration and the Development Loan Fuad, and transferred them to AID,
together with the Cooley Lean Program of the Export-Insert Bank. In sh^rt,
AID was constituted to coordinate and carry out the various financial
functions related to the U.S.Government's extended and coop^^henslve foreign
economic aid program. AID thus now administers the Public Law 480 Local
Currency Lean Program, formerly handled by the Export-Import Bank, finances the
cost of conducting the investment surveys in foreign countries, makes
dollar development leans to private borrowers, and, above all, administers
the Investment Guaranty Program. It is interesting to note here that
the eophasis of the functions of AID is to encourage U.S. business to partleipa
in the development of the sovereign countries. In other words, the slant
is that the U.S. businesses operating in ether countries should not oioly
think of their respective growth per se. but should contribute to the
economic growth of the host countzy as well.
Of AID'S role in developing the infrastructure of the underdeveloped
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esuntries, this is vhat one study has to say:
The agency is continuing to operate a wide variety of technical
assistance progranis designed to ioprove the investmoit climate
in developing countries and to help these countries build their
local lavs and institutions as a necessary pre-condition to
productive investment, both local and foreign. It assists
in the local developnaent of co-operatives, credit unions,
mortgage banks, and savings and lean associations, as well as
industrial development banks.^
No extended data with regard to AID's econoiaie assistance to foreign
countries need be given. It is sufficient to mention that through the
fiscal year 1963, the total assistance amounted to 35*9 billion dollars.
Even more Interesting is the percentage share in the growing gross
national preduct(GNP) of the cotuatiy, from about 2 percent of the GNF
in 1949, when the Marshall Plan was started, to four tenths of 1 percent
in the fiscal year 1963. Undertaken on both humanitarian and natural
sectirity considerations, there can be no doubt that this nmssive assist¬
ance has gone to develop the infrastructure and/or economically strategic
industries of the recipient countries. Indeed, it is in this respect
that the U.S. foreign aid plays a vital role in furthering economic growth,
frequently providing the differences between the satisfactory economic
growth Emd stagnation, and that such assistance coopliments the efforts
by the recipient nations on their own behalf. Surely they provide the
direct opportunity and also the overall climate for the U.S. businesses
to operate in such countries.
Without going into detail, it may be obsei^ed that U.S. aid serves
a variety of purposes: "to help to broaden the capital base of developing
countries; to facilitate the transfer of skills and knowledge through >
technical assistance; and, in soma instances, to assist in the maintenance
of the political and economic stability that is prerequisite for economic
^ Financing International Operations (American Management Associa¬
tion: New York, 1963), p.65.
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growth,"^
Helping towards the same objective is the Investaent Survey
Program mm by AID. This program is intended to make identification and
feasibility studies of specific projects in foreign countries. It need
hardly be mentioned that it is feasibility and identification from the
point of view of U.S. business Interested in such projects. AID, in
collaboration with interested private enterprise, undertakes such studies
at the request of the private enterprise. AID provides 50 percent of
the financial assistance to start with. When an interested conpany
ioplements a project which was found to be possible, the conpany is
required to pay the full cost of the survey. Otherwise the goverament
dees not ask for the repayment of the 50 percent but retains the study
data and report. On a cost sharing basis, AID had conpleted 29 faasl-
bllity studies the end of 1963. There is no data available immediate*
ly as to how many of these have been ioplemented in practice. What is
iG^ortant for the purpose of this study is the fact that the government
is willing to explore the business possibilities abroad in partnership
with private enterprise, even to the extent of sharing in the cost of
such efforts.
This kind of governmental role, especially in a land of free enter¬
prise, is unique. In a fundamental sense, it is also characteristically
reasonable in the perspectives of international operation. The foreign
countries are not as freely amenable to studies for promotion of business
by private individuals or enterprise. The laws, customs, political
climate, economic hlstoxy and 'the (governments of foreign countries are net
^ Economic Beport of the President, 1965, p.lM*
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@nl7 far fram the stage ef private entexprise la the United States but are
very much mere "ferelga" than similar factors in the home country. Be¬
cause ef reasons ef cost and ef nea-financial difficulties, such studies
can e3aly be undertaken with the eeeperatlen ef the government. Unless
the imprint of the government of the country te which the enterprise belongs
is given, the enterprise has no lecus standi in foreign countries. The
rationale ef this line of governmental assistance is thus clear.
Finally, in this area, partiy te assistand partly te enthuse
private enterprise in taking up foreign operations, AID maintains a catalog
on a continuing basis ef investment information and eppertunities abroad.
In addition, the file of feasibility and economic studies ef different pro¬
jects that have net already been taken up by private enterprise are avail¬
able to prospective International business executives. AID also maintains
voluBdnous data on market capital requirements for different projects,
mappever, profitability data and other relevant information.
To sum tp, the economic assistance, examining projects in cooperation
with private enterprise and acting as a clearing house of relevant econo¬
mic data on different countries constitute the first facet of the govern¬
mental role in promoting and developing U.S. business enterprise abroad.
The U.S.Government: Direct Financial Role
Next to providing the dlimate and the opportunity, the government
provides financing for private enterprises operating abroad. Under Section
201 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, AID can make the dollar loans
to private enterprises in relation to their operations abroad. Such loans
may be made la the form of local currency, i.e.. the currency ef the country
in which the business operates, and are known as Cooley Leans. The leans
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naay also be Im the fora of direct dollar loans.
In Qiaklng such leans, AID uses a few obvious criteria: (l) the reason¬
ableness of the prospect of repayment; (2) whether the dollar loans would
ordinarily be used in procuring components of the projects for which the
required loan would be spent in the United States — in case of local
currency loans the borrower is con^elled to spend in the concerned countzy;
(3) the profitability of the project of the enterprise asking for the loan
as well as the risk involved and the local participation involved in the
ownership of the project and (4) the limit of the loan being 50 percent of
the cost of the total equity of the project for whl(^ the loan is sought.
These are the broad criteria v^on which the request for a loan is decided.
Presently, loans carry an interest of 5.75 percent.
The rationE^.e of the government lean is not difficult to understand.
The provision for grant of local leans originated partly from the accumu¬
lation of local currencies under the Feed for Peace Program and the sale
of surplus agricultural commodities abroad. The prevision for food and sale
of agricultural commodities is accepted in the local currency of the recip¬
ient countries in order to lighten the foreign exchange pressiure that would
otherwise have to be faced by those comtries. The accumulation of foreign
currencies in this manner, in its turn, prompted the idea of using them to
soDffl advantage for the U.S. economic interest — whence the local currenqy
loan authority given to AID.
The rationale of the dollar loan is more straightforward. In recog¬
nition of the distinctive nature of the initial operation,the dollar loan
provision was written into the Foreign Assistance Act. In some msasxure
its rationale is similar to that of the Small Business Administration leans
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vithia the United States*
As f@r the Local Currency Lean,
...under Section 104(e), Title I of the Public Lav 4^» the
Agricultural Trade Develeptoent and Assistance Act of 1954> aome
of the foreign currencies received hy the H.S.Government in payment
of surplus agricultural cenmiodltles may be lent to qualified
borrovers to develop business and e3q}and trade.*.local currencies
may be leaned te (1; V.S.firms or their branches, subsidiaries, or
affiliates for business development and trade expansion In the
foreign country or (2) either U.S.firms of the local country for
expanding markets for, and consun^tion of, U.S.agricultural
products
The local currencies which are available in countries by the sale of
sTurplus U.S. agricultural commodities tinder Public Law 4^0 are lent to
the U.S. borrowers for long-term investment or for working capital.
This type of loan is useful only if the investor wishes te participate in
business in an area where the funds are restricted te U.S.Investors and can
be made ehly te foreign firms for the expainsion of markets for U.S.agri¬
cultural products abroad. They may net be made for the manufacture of
products that will be exported to the United States in coBpetition with
American products.
In 1963, 46 loans for the dollar amount of $42 million was approved.
"In February 1944» the AID approved 45 Cooley Loans in 15 countries, in
the amount of foreign currencies equivalent to about $123 million avail-
2
able in the currencies of 24 countries for Cooley Leans.”
Concerning dollar loans, it is AID's policy to encourage invest¬
ments which will contribute to the economic development of less developed
countries with eiq>hasl3 on assisting long-range development plans. Under
Section 201 of the Foreign Assistance Act of I96I, as amended, AID is
^ Financing International Operation, op.cit., p.70.
^ Ada Wrigley, "Lending Agencies Help," International Commerce.
Noveinber I6, 19^» p*12.
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authorized to make dollar leans to private as well as public enter¬
prises, both U.S. and foreign.
Any request for a dollar loan by AID should be supported by all the
information necessary to determine the equity participation, economic
Justification, technical feasibility, and costs. The request for a loan
must be accompanied by a description of how engineering, purchasing, cea-
struotion and management of the project will be carried out and by an
appropriate financial projection.
How does this financial assistance help U.S. business enterprise in
practice? As mentioned earlier, apart from other considerations, such loans
are predicated on how they will help U.S. exports or how the loan proceeds
will be spent in the United States. The perspective on this is provided
by Figure 3 which shews the kinds of industrial activities that were bene¬
ficiaries of AID leans and the pr^ortlen of the e:3q)orts that was financed
by this kind of loan. In the fiscal year 1963, AID financed the purchase
of commodities to the order of |1,095 million, of which |8S5 million was
procured in the United States.
To sum up, the various categories of loans in local currencies and
direct dollar loans constitute the emphatic role that the U.S.Govemment
plays in developing American enterprise abroad. As will have been seen
from the brief data given, the governmental role in practice has not been
insignificant.
THE U.S.Govemaenti Other Financial Roles
In addition to direct role-playing, the government, through ether
agencies, such as the Export-Import Bank, Foreign Credit Insurance Associa¬
tion, Private Long-Term Financing Agreements ai^ various international
U3
AS A PERCENTAGE
Purchased in United States
Purchased in 19 Developed Countries
Purchased in Developing Countries
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ageaoles, supplements Its role considerably.
Tho rationale ef these indirect developments is not difficult te
understand. In the inter>^ar years, many tJ.S. private investments were
casualties of default and expropriation by the debtor countries. In
consequence, in postwar years, it has been felt nedessary te channel
Investment through international agencies and/or a consortia ef nations.
The basis for this approach is obviously that no debtor country wishes
to incur the displeasure of a group ef nations by resorting te hasty
e3q)ropriations ef foreign investments or deliberately defaulting on the
repayment of such investments. From the point of view of the recipient
countries, the investment country, through such agencies,assures them
that the "flag would not follow the business" la any manner whatsoever.
Now about the particulars ef the agencies in this field.
The first is the Export-Import Bank. The Export-Ioqjort Bank ef
Washington, D.C., is the eldest international agency of the U.3.Government,
established by an Executive Order in 1934 to stimulate and facilitate the
financing of U.S. international trade. The Bank can make dollar loans
for the purchase of U.S. goods and services, issue guaranties, write in¬
surance on export transactions, and participate la medium-term e3q>orter
credits.
There are two basic Bank policies that apply throughout all its
programs; first, the Beink stqpplements and encourages private
capital and does not compete with it; second, leans are made for
specific puxp^es and must offer reasonable assurance ef payment.
The fees and premiums charges for guaranties and insurance
are commenstirate with the risks covered.^
Though the primazy purpose ef -tiie EXIM Bank is to promote the export trade of
the United States, the greatest purpose of the Bankas activity consists ef
^ Financing IntematieneJ. Operation, eu.cit.. p.74.
45
e3q}ort flnaBciag,^ aad it is obvious that the Back's efforts must also
help the U.S. business abroad direotly or iodirectlj.
The Bank, it may be meatiened, operates uader restrictieni the loaj&s
eutstandiag plus its gmraaty reserves, at any one time,
may met exceed $9 billioa. As of ^uae 30, 1964* the loans outstanding
and uadisbursed totaled |5*26 billioa, reserves for iasuraace and
guaranties were $0.29 billion, so that of the $9 billioa authorized, there
was an uncommitted balance of $3*45 billion.
The second specialized agency of a coiqparable type is the Foreign
Credit Insurance Association. On October 27, 19^1, President Kennedy
announced the formation of the FCIA, which had an original membership of
14 companies, since increased to more than 70 of the U.S. leading stock
and mutual carriers. This Association was formed mainly for the purpose
of enabling e:q)ertera to sell on credit and to provide them protection
against the commercial credit and political risks to which they are exposed
when they extend terms to buyers abroad.
By applying the principles of insurance and the low averages, the
Association mitigates the common hazards to which the snorters are subject
when they sell on credit. The FGIA, unlike other types of insurance,
endeavors to stabilize commsreial credit granting, individually and threi;gh
international associations. The assoclatlen is not based, however, on
the assumption that the exporter can extend credit lii^>rudently; rather,
it encourages sound credit management and protects the credit grantor from
losses which cannot be foreseen or otherwise guarded against. The FCIA's
meinber coa;}anie3 assume all the commercial risks and a few of the psliti»
cal risks. By virtue of its meDd}ership with the Berne Union, an later-
T p.74
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national associatiea, the FOIA Is able to iaterchasge iaformatien aad
experience, and make reooimiMBdations to keep payment terms vlthin reason¬
able bounds, thus avoiding a credit race.
The political risks insured by FCI4 include: war, hostiles, civil
war, rebellion, revolution, insurrection, civil commotion, or other like
disturbances, requisition, expropriation, confiscation, or intervention
of the business of the buyer or guarantor by a governmental authority,
and incovertibility of foreign currency into dollars. The cancellation
or non-renewal of an export license, or the imporition of restrictions
on the export of products, not subject to such imposition or restriction
prior to the date of shipment, and not due to the fault of the buyer.
The commercial credit risks insured are (l) insolvency of the
buyer and (2) failure of the buyer to pay the insured within six months
after due date for products delivered to and accepted by the buyer.
The idea of credit insurance, however, net with some resistance
from the exporters on two different grounds. Firstly, an exporter is
in a better position to know the ability and needs of his customers than
an Insurer; and secondly, such an exporter,because of his past experience
and dealings with the customers, can figure out a bad debts loss ratio,
the maintenance of which is less expensive than the cost of the premium
for insurance. The question may arise, therefore, as to how far this
Association is helpftil to the exporters? In answer, it may be stated that
the cost of the FCIA insurance averages a fraction of 1 percent of most
credit sales and, as such, no exporter would hesitate to take this addition¬
al security at this negligible cost, especially when ^mst experience is not
always a dependable guide for the future in view of the ’’foreignness” of
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the nature ef the boslaese involved.
Now to turn to the third category of aid for foreign busiHese
operation. The Secretary ef Agriculture is authorized to enter into
agreements with the U.S. and foreign trade parties with a view tot
(1) e3sJ.ist the participation ef private enterprise stimulating
and increasing the sale of U.S. surplus agricultural commodi¬
ties for dollars,
(2) develop foreign markets for such commodities and at the
same time
(3) assist in the development of the private sector of the
economies ef friendly countries.^
The agreement is entered into with the Commodity Credit Corporation on
behalf of the government.
The eomosodities under this program must be sold in a foreign countiy
for a local currency. The seller has a period of three years in which
to dispose of the surplus commidity. The U.S. Government secures repay¬
ment in dollars but the repayment is spread ever a period of twenty years
at a rate ef approximately 4 percent interest. The interest rates are
net more thsm the current cost of money to the United States Treasury.
To obtain these funds the buyer must have a specific foreign investment
project. To illvistrate how this works, an actual exan^ile may be given:
In January 6, 196$, the first private trade agreement was signed
by the Persian Gas ^distribution Company, S.A. (PERSIAGAS), a
private business firm in Teheran, Iran. Under the agreement,
PERSIAGAS is authorized to purchase up to $674,000 worth — about
360,000 bushels — of U.S. wheat for resale in Iran. The
agreement provided that the Coomsdity Credit Corporation should
finance the Iranian company's purchase ef the wheat from U.S.
suppliers, plus an additional amotmt for ocean transportation,
making the total export market value of the transaction $750,000.
The Iranian company was to use the local currency(rials) received
from its resale of wheat to expand facilities for processing and
distribution of liquid petroleum gas in Teheran and other pro¬
vincial centers in Iran. Repayment to the Commodity Credit
Corporation in dollars was to be out of profits from the expanded
operation of PERSIAGAS but within a seven-year period, the aid
^ Ibid., p.86.
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being at an annual Interest ef 4 percait*^
This clearly shows the financial role of the Commodity Credit Corporation.
Under the Private Trade Agreement, the surplus agricultural commo¬
dities may be exported to other soverlga countries, but such export should in
no way affect the usual commercial sales of the commodity, thereby pre¬
venting the displacement of cash. The payment of i^his is deferred, but
such payment in dollars is assured by the Community Credit Corporation
by an arrangement with the banks or finance compemies of the United States,or
of the host country. The purpose of this is the selling of the commodi¬
ties and the utilization of the sales proceeds for the development or
expansion of other business project or projects. After a certain period,
the amount of the loan is paid back out of the profits of the projects —
in dollars, of course.
The device of the Private Trade Agreement is unique. It is a
device to promote sales of surplus agricultural commodities of the country
while trying to bestow passing financial assistance to private enterprises
engaged in expanding or developing its own business. The agreement is
developed by and between private parties, i.e., a foreign party and the
U.S. Government, to buy and sell svuplus agricultural commodities.
The U.S. and International Agencies
Many of the international institutions offering financial assist¬
ance to the firms aerating in foreign countries are very largely U.S.
supported. Accordingly, they may be briefly reviewed here.
The largest and most important of the International agencies in
this respect is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
^ Ibid.. p.87.
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(IBRD) popularly known as the World Bank. The IBRD or World Bank
opened its doors for business in the year 1946. It is a lending insti¬
tution that makes available its capital in lean form at a fixed Interest
rate — for long terms, often. It does not participate, however, in
equity Investment, nor does it issue guarantees on any investment,
although its articles permit the Bank to do so. "The World Bank makes
loans to government, governmental agencies, and private enterprises of
member countries, mainly for undertakings directed toward helping these
nations build the infrastructure of their economic growth."^
More than half of its funds (having collected a total of $2,100
million in capital subscriptions from 102 member countries) have been leaned
for periods of 20 years or more. Its interest rate is flexible, depending
on the current costs of money and of administration charges. In 1965»
the interest rate plus administration charges was about 5*5 percent. The
Bank is run as a profit making institution and interest rates are charged
varying with the rates at which the Bank has been able to raise money in
the market.
Incidentally, the Bank does not require that funds be spent in any
particular country, but follows a worldwide procurement policy — which
means that a borrower may spend its funds for necessary supplies, equip¬
ment and materials in any of the World Bank's member countries or their
territories and in Switzerland. As of June, I964, the World Bank and
the International Development Association (IDA), an affiliate of the Bank,
have financed the purchase of supplies J^om the following countries in the
following amounts (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars): United States,




Japan, $173: Canada, $l6l; Belgium, $138; Switzerland, $123; Sweden, $77;
Netherlands, $63; all ethers (excluding disbursements in the berrewing
deuntxy), $215*
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) was created in 1956
by a treaty to inclement dconemic development in member countries by
investing without gevemtimnt guaranty In productive private enterprise.
The role of the institution has been described thus:
In association with private investors, it helps to finance
productive private enterprises. IFC does net con^ete with
private capital; it is in effect a lender or investor of last
resort, acting only in cases where stifflcient private capital
is not available on reasonable terms. IFC also acts as a
catalyst in bringing together investment opportunities, domestic
and foreign private capital, and experienced management.
Finally, it seeks to stimulate the flow of private capital, both
domestic and foreign, into productive investment in member
eountfies.l
In contrast to the International Cevdopment Association, this agency
finances the private enterprise only. The membership of this institution
is open to all countries that belong to the World Bank, emd, by the end
of 1964> the member countries totaled 78. Though the r^ayment of its
loans are generally in dollars, repayment in local currency b7 the member
countries can be arianged edso. The rate of interest for loans is net
fixed and is negotiable. Ibe IFC, in its operation, has established four
main methods for (l) direct investment in industrial conpanles, with the
participation of domestic or foreign investors and entrepreneurs; (2)
assistance to privately owned development finance cotipanies engaged in
industrial financing; (3) standby and underwriting comiaitments; (4) and the
sale of investment from its portfolio to other financial institutions.
The IFC may retain the right to participate in the profits as well as
1 Ibid.,
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la the growth of the beneficiary business* Any productive private enter¬
prise in the territory of a member country is eligible for IFC assistance up
to 50 percent cf the finance required. The two basic criteria for assist¬
ance are (l) the enterprise must be private in character, and (2) the
project is designed to make a usrful contribution to the develepo»nt of the
economy of the meDoiber country in which it is located.
Yet another organization of similar kind but specifically for opera¬
tions in Latin American countries is the Inter-American Development Bank,
organized in 19^0, to accelerate the economic and social development of
its member ceiutries. All the Latin American republics are members,
except Cuba, The United States is not only a member of the Bank but has
contributed very largely to its resources*
The Bank is authorized to extend lean or guaranties to governments
of member countries or to any other political subdivisions, or to private
enterprises, to finance the development and expansion of projects, which,
in its opinion, have the economic priority. The Bank does not lend money
for refinancing operations, working capital, but only for capital assets
of such projects.
By the end of 1964> the Bank had authorized a total of 261 loans
amounting to $1,165*5 million* Disbursements at that date amounted to
$404*3 million* The total cost of the projects, however, was estimated
at $3*4 billion*
A SummBTv
Anxious to help the country's private enteirprise in developing
foreign operation, but at the same time no less anxious that goveimmental
efforts should net turn out to be a substitute for what the free enterprise
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system might achieve on its own initiative; anxious, in other vords, to
strengthen private business motives and initiatives in this respect,
the U.S. Government has developed a vide range of facilities to financially
help private enterprise in its international operations; taken together
they represent a carefully af^raised program of flUlng in the lacuna of
private efforts in this respect, especially as governmental facilities are
Intended to be available vhen ether traditional facilities are not ^en.
Analogous to this financial role playing is the role of the government
to explore the business prospects in foreign countries.
In the foregoing pages we have attes^ted to explain, understand
and Interpret what the U.S. Government has been doing in these respects.
But given the setting up of the enterprises, what of the risks of operating
in a foreign climate — social and economic? Eou about the risks and
uncertainties arising therefrom — risks that per se do net pertain to
running a business? Fir what the U.S.Government has been doing to help
private enterprise meet these challenges, we now turn to the ne±t chapter.
CHAPTER 17
THE GOVERNMENTAL ROLE II: INVESTMENT GUARANTEE
ImterHatioftal buslaess bristles with risk vhlch Is peculiarly Its
cua aad has ao couaterpart 1q heme eperatloas. la large meastire, the risk
sprlags from the fact that the buslaess has te deal with ferelga goverameata
aad chaaglag political aystems. Also, mere thaa la home eperatloas, the
lavestor has to work with aa Imperfect kaowledge aad foresight. It becomes
aeeessary, therefore, for the goverameat to step la aad help private eater-
prise. la the years followlag World War II, the Halted States Goverameat
has takea the pioneering step of developing the Investment guarantee pro¬
gram.
Introduction
The U.S. goverameat la order to encourage private Investments
abroad, has drawn a program to g\iaraatee the U.S.private lavestsienta
la ferelga countries. As the resources la the private sector of the
United States are mere them the government, aad the U.S. government to
fulfill Its foreign policy objectives must take the help of private Invest¬
ors, the Investment Guarantee Program was established.
la this chapter, an atteo^t will be made to study the origin,
purpose, philosophy and the general features of the Program. Aa atteopt
will also be made to escplala Its operation — la practice — la countries
and areas la which the Guarantee Is extended, the cost aad amount of total





The luvestmeot Guarantee Program was established under the Economic
Coeperatiea Act ef 1948, expanded thereafter under the J&itual Security Pro¬
gram and has new been taken ever by AID. The programme view is to guar¬
antee the U.S. investors against certain political and business risks taken
in operating a business enterprise in a friendly but less-developed country.^
The International Cooperation Administration (new AID) and the
U.S. government's foreign aid agency, administers the program. It is,
however, assisted by the Enport-Inpert Bank, which acts as an agent ef
the International Cooperation Administration, presently merged in AID.
The guarantee contract is between the private enterprise and the govern¬
ment. For the latter:
the ICA develops the individual guarantee contract, but the
contract is written as an agreement between the investor and
the Export-In^ort Bank, and the eligibility for a contract is
subject to the certification by the ICA.2
The program is limited to U.S. investments abroad that further the
economic development of resources and productive capacities of the less-
developed countries. It is also limited to new investments rather than
to investments that have been irrevocably committed before an application
for a gixarantee was made. The purpose of the program is to encourage,
therefore, investments beyond what unaided Inpelling private interest would
dictate — beyond what extra conservative management would undertake.
The Investment Guarantees: The Rati^ale
That the investment guarantee is offered only to investments that
^ The question ef which is a less-developed country is usually left to
the President of the United States, although Congress has specified a number
of countries that should not be so considered.
Walter Krause, Eccaomic Developn^nt (Wordsworth Publishing Go, San
Francisco, 196l), p.315.
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help econoQilc develepmeBt in underdeveloped countries is significant. This
may veil be interpreted as an extension of the logic of "economic welfare)
in the realm of international business. When the U.S. enterprise operates
in a foreign covmtry, it surely helps the heme econotny, but when such
enteringise helps development of host countries, the total economic welfare
is obviously enhanced further.
It may be obseirved here that the present day contribution of the U.S.
economy for the development of less-developed nations is considered inade¬
quate by the U.S. government, measured by what is believed to be needed to
facilitate the economic development of such countries . Big business
risks that the program covers are peculiarly characteristic of the less-
developed countries, as the political history of our times would an^ly
testify to. Hence the scope of the program is limited to less-developed
countries. If U.S. investnoents in the host country are dovetailed into
its economic development programs, such investments would have had the host
coimtry's real consent and would, even otherwise, be dealt with seriously
by its government. Hence the limitation of the program to investments
that facilitate economic growth of the less-developed countries.
The Specific Risks in the Program
The U.S. Congress has authorized AID to offer three types of guaran¬
tees. One is described as purely pollticcd risk — risk of exchange con¬
vertibility, expropriation and confiscation, losses due to war and revolu¬
tion. AID guarantees to the investors to convert the foreign investment
into dollars and actual repayment in dollars. It will guarantee the in¬
vestor against the inability to convert into dollars foreign currency received
as dividends, as a return of the guaranteed investment, or (in cases of a
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Idem) as paTtnent of interest and principal. In cases of expropriation
or confiscation of investment (including creeping expropriation), the AID
guarantees the investor against the losses due to expropriation and con¬
fiscation by the government of the host country* Especially will it
guarantee against losses of (1) investment in equity and retained earnings
attributable to that investment and (2) accrued interest or principal of a
lean. In cases of loss due to veo*, revolution or insurrection, the guar¬
antee is for the loss due to the outbreak of war, or Internal revolution,
in the host countries. Specifically, it will compensate for the physical
damageeto the project directly resulting from such war, revolution or in¬
surrection.
How the Claim is Settled
Here it may be mentioned that whether made as equity, loans, credits,
royalties, or leasing arrangements, investments eligible for political risk
coverage may be in the following terms:
Gash: If cash is to be invested, it must be dollars, credits in dollars, or
foreign currency (1) purchased with dollars for the purpose of the invest¬
ment or (2) otherwise acquired or eimed by the Investor and transferable into
dollars.
Materials or equipment: Both used and new materials or equipo^nt may be
considered to be investment contributions.
Patents, processes, or techniques: Because it is desirable to encourage
the spread of technology, m^er some circumstances, contributions of patents,
processes, and techniques in exchange for equity shares may be eligible for
guarantees.
Services: Contributions of engineering and management services in exchange
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for equity shares will usually be considered investments only vhen performed
for the purpose of transmitting other eligible investments, such as processes
and techniques. Contracts for services that are currently and separately
paid for may also be eligible.
Loan guarantees: Guarantees of repayment given by Investors on leans made
by financial institutions may be considered eligible investments.
Long-term suppliers' credits: The extanslon of long-term credits by equip¬
ment suppliers may be eligible for guarantees.
The second type of risk coverage is uhat may be called extended risks.
Under this clause, AID would extend the coverage for almost any type of
risk. This would not, of course, include the coverage for those risks
such as fraud or misconduct. AID is prepared to guarantee against any
and all risks
(except these involving fraud or misconduct on the part of the
Investor and these risks for which commercial insurance is available)
up to 75 percent of long-term loans to priority industrial projects
in less developed countries. It is anticipated that the remaining
percentage of the investment risk would be eligible for the specific-
risk insurance described above.1
AID would also give the coverage of extended risk guarantees for
equity Investments^ in exceptional circumstances, in very high-risk areas,
but such guarantee will not cover more than 50 percent of an investment.
To encourage professional lending organisations such as banks,
insurance co[i^)anies, pension funds, and Edge Act corporations to
extend loems to eligible development projects, the Agency is prepared
to have its guaranty apply against the last 75 percent of the amount
of a loan, with the unguaranteed portion concentrated in the early
maturities. For example, on a $10 million loan payable in 16
equal equal annual installments, the last twelve installments would
be 100 percent guaranteed by the U.S. government. The risk of
default of the first four installments nay be covered by a U.S.
commercial bank willing to take shorter-term risks or by some other
party such as & U.S. equity investor that is interested in the
^ Financing of International Operation (American ^knagement Associa¬
tion, New York, 1965), p*69.
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success of the project.^
Am investor to be eligible for an extended risk guarantee for his
loss must see that the loan is part of a sound financial plan in support
of a high priority project, made and repayable in U.S. dollars, amortized
over a period reasonably related to the p\irpose of the loan, the ability of
the borrower to pay, and to the ability of the country in which the project
is located to service the debt; and must bear an appropriate rate of
interest.
On the other hand, this guarantee will not be available if:
1} the investment in project would result in an unacceptable effect upon
the U.S. economy or balance of payments; (2) an alternative guarantee is
available otherwise; (3) the necessary private financing is available on
reasonable terms without guarantee and (4) that the loan is not for refin¬
ancing the indebtedness.
The third type is the extended risk guarantees covering losses on
riot or demonstrations, and private housing projects. This is Intended
to stimulate private home ownership for middle- and lower-income families
by means of guarantees of long-term mortgage type. Of financing of housing
projects similar to those insured by the Federal Housing Administration in
the United States since May 15, 19^4, AID has suspended receipt of housing
lean applications for Latin America because of heavy over-subscriptions,
but projects elsewhere in the world are still considered.
The Program: General Features
Before a guarantee is issued, a prior agreement between the United
States and the foreign government must be signed, instituting the guarantee
1 Ibid
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program in any particular area. For fifty less-developed countries, and
in a number of overseas dependencies of the developed countries, guarantees
are available against one or all of the mentioned risks. These agreements,
however, do not provide for special treatment by the host government of
guaranteed Investments but they do provide the investors with the U.S. govern¬
ment’s assurance that they will be protected up to the amount specified in
the guarantee contract for the risks covered.
As mentioned earlier, there are mainly three types of risks coverage
available from AID for U.S. private investment in the different countries
abroad. There are sixty-four less-developed countries with which the guar¬
antee arrangement is available. In Africa, there are Menty-eight countries,
the highest number, where this guarantee is made available for the private
investment. Next in sequence come the Latin American countries, where the
guarantee is available in twenty countries. In Asia there are twelve and
in Europe four countries ^here this guarantee is also available.
It may be mentioned here that the countries where guarantee for
private foreign investment is available, the coverage for all political risks
is also available. As for the two types of extended risks, the coverage
is net available in most of the Latin American, European or Asian countries.
On the other hand, the reverse is true for African countries. The countries
not entitled to the privilege of Investment guarantee are Avistralia, Austria,
Japan, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Hong Kong, Italy, Liechtenstein,
Luxemburg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Union of South
Africa, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and West Germa]^.
Finally, about the manner of operation. The Economic Cooperation
Act of 1948, which established the Investment Guarantee Program, provides.
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tinder Section 3 of subsection (ll), that the administrator may charge a
fee la an amount determined by him, not exceeding 1 percent per annum of
the amount of each guarantee. The normal fee as mentioned la the Act,
and stated above, 1 percent. Is charged for each type of guarantee
program. In other words, investors can select the type of risks he wishes
to be covered, and a separate charge Is coDEputed for each type of coverage.
The Intention of charging this fee Is to make the program self-supporting.
It Is necessary, or rather very loportant, for a U.S. Investor who
wishes to obtain a guarantee to make an application to the Investment
Division of AID before signing the contract or entering Into any firm
commitments on investment abroad. It Is necessary for him to obtain an
assurance from AID, even though this assurance does not commit AID to Issue
the guarantee contract.
How much of the Amount Is Covered bv this Program?
How Is the facility being made use of?
The gxiarantees issued from the Inception of the Investment Guarantee
Program in 1948 through mid-1959 totaled $0.45 billion.^
At the establishment of the program the celling on Issuance of guar¬
antees was only $0.5 billion. This amount was subsequently raised In 1959
to $1 billion. The celling was subsequently raised. It is clear from
Table 9 that from the year 1948, l.e.. the year when the program was estab¬
lished and until the middle of 1965, the amount guaranteed in force tinder
this program was $2.47 billion (cumulative). The highest amount of guar¬
antee was la Argentina, next was India,with the amounts being $0.52 billion
and $0.21 billion (approximately) respectively. It would appear further
from Table 9 that the coverage was mostly in the area of convertibility
1 Gallatin Annual of International Business. 1965 (American Heritage
Publishing Co.Inc., New York), p.l28.
TABLE 9
CUMULATIVE VALUE OF SPECIFIC RISK INVESTl'ENT GUARANTEES GIVEN
UNDER U.S. AID PROGRAM: 1948-Jutt0 30. 1965












Gaboa 2a 2a 488
Ghana 420 420 840
Guinea 31,100 103,600 20,100 154;800
iTory Coast 2,555 2,555 995 6,i04
Liberia 1,400 20,758 710 22,868
Morocco 3,167 2,799 1,330 7,297
Nigeria 7,432 5,579 13,012
Senegal 324 324 100 748
Sierra Leone 11,105 19,980 19,237 50,322
Somalia as a5 222 1,112
Sudan 2,250 1,215 3,465
Togo 62,166 21,930 20,162 20,074
Ttinisla 3,617 7,433 3,680 U,730
ASU
Afghanistan 400 200 200 800
China, Rep(Formosa) 29,4a 27,020 17,652 74,117
Cyprus 85 85 170
India 115,160 90,251 205,411
Iran 20,476 15,994 36,470
Israel 1,225 1,972 8,009 11,206







Laos 1,500 1,500 3,000
Malaysia 843 1,598 2,442
Nepal 50 50 50 150
Pakistan 9,693 78,227 87,920
Philippines 8,985 5,583 U,568
Thailand 16,064 12,805 9,890 38,759
Turkey 110,733 53,759 m 164,936




Austria 1,030 1,000 2,030
Belgium 432 120 552
Denmark 183 183
France 34,356 15,934 50,289
Germany, Vest 13,876 44,856 58,731
Greece 5,382 4,988 2ii525 12,895
Italy 113,637 44,908 676 159,221
Netherlands 7,445 3,883 11,328
Portugal* 8,227 12,227 20,454
United Kingdom 32,381 32,381
Yugoslavia 2,000 2,000 4,000
LATIN AMERICA
(Central & South America)
Argentina 319,850 164,468 37,875 522,192
Bolivia 1,164 21,100 22,264
Chile 6,272 4,479 3,U7 13,898
Colombia 54,522 58,444 37,019 U9,985
Costa Rica 1,339 8,406 5 .9,744
Dominican Rep. 3,625 7,475 30,760 41,860
Ecuador 8,770 8,685 4,048 41,504
El Salvador 4,239 4,516 8,755
Guatemala 447 ?,772 3,219
Haiti 9,772 10,642 20,415
Bonduras 5,878 28,943 34,821
Jamaica 206 206
Nicaragua 2,610 3,346 645 6,601
Panama 496 10,397 496 11,390
Fazaguay 3,912 6,912 10,824
Peru 23,629 - 23,629
Trinidad & Tobago 56,498 34,972 33,000 124,470
Venezuela 7,516 22,276 15,883 45,665
Source: Agency fer International Development, Office of Develspment, Finance
and Private Enterprise, Investment Guaranties Division, Washington,
D.C.
^Includes Porguguese territories.
€U)d expropriation. There are only a fev countries iihere war risk coverage
against investment is issued, and these countries are mostly in Africa.
The author is ef the opiAion that, while the program's services
unquestionably help to dispel uncertainty and indecision and hence help to
stimulate private foreign investment, the program could have done even more.
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Its limited achievement may veil be due to two factors — limited scope
and the cost of the premium.
Under an amendment to the ]y&itual Security Act, under vhlch legisla¬
tion the ICA operates, effective January 1, I960, issuance of new guarantees
was henceforth to be restricted "to investments that will further the devel¬
opment and productive capacities of less developed areas.The effect
of this amendment, to all intents and purposes, was to exclude Europe from
the program. This action was taken as one move in response to adverse
balance of payments experienced by the United States during 1958-59.
Besides, being voluntazy, there are countries where the U.3. private
investors do not feel like taking the protection of this program, even theu^
it is available, inasmuch as the investor feels secure about his risk
judgment. Besides, not all the major risks, to which foreign investment
is subject, are currently insurable. The author is of the view that cover¬
age should be extended to include the risks associated with possible deval¬
uation and with possible damage from civil disturbances short of war. Also
the program needs to be extended to additional countries where there is defic¬
iency in investment climate but the countries need external capital. As
for the cost of the protection, it is often considered to be high. In
some cases, there is a discrepancy between the official rate and the free
market rate for the same cevexage. Even though the intention of charging
the fee is to make the program self-supporting, the coverage should be avail¬
able, with lesser cost,at least in some cases, to give special inducement
for investment in some countries where the investment climate is not favor¬
able.
^ International Coi^eratlon Administration, Digest. January 19, I960.
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It canast be denied, however, that this program has appeared te
offer hope as a meaningful avenue to stimulate investment in foreign
countries, i.e.. the less developed areas, by the U.S. private investors,
and will continue to encourage such investments in the years to come.
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to present and explain
briefly the development of one of the unique methods in international busi¬
ness operations. Arising out of the unprecedented risks in such operations,
the international executives bad to turn to the government to provide the
facility. What is characteristio of the Investment Guarantee Program is
that it does not tal« over the normal risk of entrepreneurship whence
the provision of guarantee for only 50 percent of the equity investment in
international projects — equally relevant is the feature of the guarantee
of leans for such projects. At the same time, the guarantee safeguards
that the "spirit of enterprise" should net be taken out of the business
activity. Accordingly, financial institutions are e:q)exted to take risks
as they normally would in financing an operation. The Guarantee Program
leaves the private enterprises to resort to normal iasiu:anoe or guarantee
methods to cover the repegrments in certain cases, thereby aot cutting into
the normal activities of the insurance coopanles and banks.
CHAPTER V
MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S. BUSINESS ABROAD
Introductlea
In our times, the growth in the number of U.S. manufacturers doing
business abroad has been phenomenal. Looking ahead, there is ever7 sign
that the upward trend will continue. Even mere remarkable is the various
roles that the government of the covintiy — the federal government — has
been playing to spur this development. In the previous chapters, an
atten^t has been made, therefore, to trace briefly, e3q>lain and Interpret
the development of the U.S. business abroad — its growth rate and the geo¬
graphic and industry-wise distribution of such growth during the last decade.
In the perspectives of such developn^nts, it Is now necessary to
ask what is it that motivates the U.S. business to go abroad and start
operations in foreign countries? Vhat kind of managerial considerations
constitute the decision-mix when it comes to actually setting up enterprises
in other countries? These questions fellow as a corollary to the develop¬
ment of the U.S. business abroad in recent years that was outlined in
Chapter II. In this chapter, an atten^t will be made, therefore, to
answer broadly the questions raised.
Motivation in Foreign Operations.
What are the motives that lure the U.S. business abroad? In the
nature of things, the answer must be based largely on empirical studies.
In recent years, there have been several studies on this. Mention may be
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made of the studies bj Bariev aud Wenier and by the United States Department
of Commerce. Partly as a check-up on these earlier studies, and partly
to secure a sound basis for any recommendation for the promotion ef foreign
investment, data vas obtained by the University ef Oregon Foreign Investment
Questionnaire in 1959. The distribution ef motives ef seventy-tvo respond¬
ent coDq)aales is given in Table 8.
The information indicates clearly that the motives in practice are
cooplez and are net singularly "profit directed." Indeed, the detailed
analysis ef the responses shews that "although 'increased profits' was the
avowed objective of 20 of the 72 con^anles replying to the questionnaire,
'increased profit' was the single reported motive for only 8 companies."^
It is equally Interesting to mention that nearly half of those reporting
stated that their motives enoeD^>a33ed several objectives — in fact, one
fifth gave a single motive, but ether than "Increased profits." Closely
tied to the profit motive is consideration given to the rapidly e3q>anding
foreign market er demand. For ezanple, the same study shows that, in respect
to investn»nt in West Germany, ef the 56 coB^anies, 44 enphasized the growth
of European demand as the major inducement, 12 spoke of the import restrict¬
ion, and 9 mentioned lower production costs.
The last two considerations — expanding demand abroad and foreign
restrictions — are easily explained. Even though the foreign operations
per se may not be ^timally profitable, sudi operations add to the gross
receipts ef the business and, "for many coi^anles the additional gross
receipts from foreign operations constitutes the difference between 'good'
and 'poor' shewing for the company's total net profits."2
1 Mikesell, op.cit.. p.88.
2 Ibid.
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As for the fourth major motivating factor — securing raw materials —
it is merely a reflection of the fact that investments must go vhere the
resources are ~ for without resources there can be no profit, even at home.
Without such foreign materials some domestic enterprises wotild either fade
or not e3q)and as they should. In other words, the business is concerned
with investments of necessity. In the same category may also be placed the
consideration of lower cost of production in the processing of materials as
a result of cost shifts and increased demand or new markets.
A few significant aspects of the distribution of motives, as given
in Table 8, may be commented upon. Firstly, the desire for "higher profits"
is not as predominant a motive as one would expect; in fact, a survey ly
McGraw Hill in I960 showed that 46 percent of the respondents emphasized
"new markets" as the most inportant factor in their decision to invest
abroad; 20 percent cited higher profit as the major factor; 16 percent
cited trade restrictions as the chief stimulus, and only 6 percent cited
low-cost foreign labor as the primary inducement. Secondly, while nation¬
alism and foreign restrictions still play a large part in determining the
direction and volume of the country’s foreign operations, it is, however,
becoming a less and less significant factor as currency convertibility and
the elimination of quantitative trade restrictions are becoming more and
more widespread. Finally, the earlier growth of the TJ.S. business in
Latin American countries to help secure resources, the more recent orient¬
ation towards Europe to avoid the trade restrictions of ESC and EFTA, and
the growth of manufacturing units in Japan and other countries to take
advantage of low production costs — these developments in, and geographic
distribution of, the U.S. operations abroad would appetur to bear close
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correlation with the dlstrlhution of motives indicated in the various
san^le studies.
To sum up:
co^)anies set up manufacturing facilities abroad for a variety
of reasons. Some want to tap the fat profits and enjoy the rapid
growth offered by expanding foreign markets. Others may establish
foreign bases with an eye to worldwide e^qports — and re-exports to
the United States — form a low cost base...today many stay-at-homes
(companies) see a threat to their home market position and the
possibility ef being blocked out of increasingly interesting foreign
markets. Some companies are already being harassed in their
domestic markets by the low-cost goods produced abroad by their U.S.
rivals (the 1957 census showed imports of $1 billion from overseas
enterprises of U.S. ooB^anles). As a reaction to these threatsi
actual or potential, many companies are hed4;ing their bets by
building beacheads of their own abroad. Thus for many reasons,
some offensive, others defensive, the flood ef American companies
overseas continues to grow.A
Risks in Foreign Operations
However mixed or varied the motives may be in setting enterprises
abroad, what about the risks involved in such ventures? How does the U.S.
business face the problem of risks of moving abroad? The problem of risks
is important for two reasons. One, this is very much integral to motiva¬
tion. Two, "setting up a new production base and marketing organization
abroad is far riskier than establishing a new business at home."^
What, then, of risk in foreign operations? How and in what manner
does it differ from risk in business at home? The answer is simple.
Setting up enterprises abroad commits funds in plant and equipment
for a long period ef time in an alien, often changing environment. Fur¬
thermore, aliaost invariably, management effort and personnel problems
generally take on an altogether new dimension as compared to operations at
home. This is so, if only because almost invariably the host country
A Madenhelm, Mazze & Stein, International Business (Articles and Essays),
(Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York), p.68.
2 Ibid.. p.68.
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insists en some form of ”aationalizati©n” of personnel and/or participation
of its nationals in the ownership and control of the enterprise — these
being enjoined on the foreign enterprise regardless of whether the nation¬
als of the host country are found to be coo^etent and efficient for the
purpose. In other words, the managerial process almost always is condition¬
ed by extraneous considerations in some measure or other. All these apart,
profits in a foreign country can sometimes have a long lead time.
How is al 1 this different when operating at home? At home, the exe¬
cutive moves with ease and confidence inasmuch as he knows the ground
rules — the distribution patterns, the trade terms, the nuances of con¬
sumer preferences, the competitor's strengths and weaknesses. In fact,
these are second nature to him, so to speak; and he operates in a familiar
environment and under a set of stable political and economic conditions.
All these do not held, obviously, when the executive is la a foreign land —
in an alien and changing environment.
In terms of business operation, the implications of the differences
just noted, goes deep. It is that many of the comfortable assumptions vis-
a-vis the home opezations may not hold true overseas. This, in turn,
cuts both ways. Looking at the overseas operations with "different eyes,"
the executive might grasp opportunities that ethers do net see — for exao^le,
drawing from home experience he may well spot a prospect for convenience
items, packaged foods, or new appliances, or he may see an opportunity for
applying a proven (at home) technique in a new situation. But at the same
time, proceeding on the same assunption, he may well stub his toe. He may
find foreign consumers reacting differently from their American cotinterparts,
■ay find that practices successful at home recoil on him abroad. Clearly,
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"both the risks and opportunities resulting from executive action abroad
are often greater than tbej would be at home.”^
Specifically, for Indlvldtial enterprises, risk may come In many
guises and vary from country to country. For example, General Motors bad
to shut down an esqjensive assembly plant in India several years ago, while
their experience in Australia and Europe has been altogether different.
The painful decision regarding the Indian operation was largely due to the
unfereseeen political climate and the effect of governmental control. Yet,
while the environment hurt General Motors it was no deterrent for others,
such as the Morris Company of England. Again, Henry J. Kaiser set up an
automobile plant in Holland, but found that it could net crack the market
there; yet its Argentine opeta.tion is doing well. One American consumer-
goods industry moved into Belgium too soon and is r^orted to have been con¬
ducting an expensive holding operation for the last few years. Another
exantple is the case of Chicago Dynamics Industries. Within one year of
investing $100,000 at Shannon's industrial estate in Ireland, it was report¬
ed to be selling out and going home, even though several other firms est¬
ablished at Shannon reported that they are doing well as tax-exempt new
industries. These examples could be multiplied. What has been said
above would amply confirm how risks in moving abroad take on many guises
and forms, and how their incidence differs from enterprise to enterprise.
Mlnlmiging Risks in Foreign Operations
To turn now to the other question: how have the U.S. businesses been
txying to face the riskiness of moving abroad? Based on the operational
experiences of American coopanles abroad, John G. McDonald of McKinsey and
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Conqpany, an international tnanagement oonsulting firm, finds four lines of
approach emerging in practice. They are: (l) evolution and take-off
approach; (2) the random approach; (3) country-by-country approach; and
The "evolution and take-off" is a long-term, step-by-step move on
the paxii of U.S. business. Looking ahead, it starts generally vlth export-
ln5)ort activity in a foreign country. This is then followed by foreign
licensing and the international movement of technical know-how, involving
very little intact on domestic operations or management outlook. When
the management has graduated through this stage and the opportunity is
beckoning, there comes the third state -- the take-off to establishing
overseas operations involving development of special international skills,
substantial international investment in funds and management time. When
this development takes place in a number of countries, the U.S.business
emerges as world enterprise with an integrated global approach encon^}assing
both domestic and overseas, operations. Many of the older and larger companies
operating abroad have gone through these four stages of evolution before
becoming world enterprises as they are today.
In practice, these stages may be taken one at a time or any one can
be bypassed. It is even possible for a company to be involved in all four
stages at the saie time. The spirit of this evolutionary process is that
any enterprise going to set up operations abroad must proceed cautiously,
gaining insight of the opportmities in the foreign country over an extended
period and in varied ways. Such evolutionary approach should help devel¬
opment of sound organization plans and safeguards, in advance, a move
^ See John G. McDonald in International Business (edited by Madenh«>^“
Mazze & Stein), p.67-6S (Publisher Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New lork.
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abroad. Further, the deeper the insight the more the foresight with which
it can move, and the less the risk it may face in setting up and operating
its enterprise therein. Indeed, "step-by-step international experience
can become a major asset if it gives a conpany this foresight."^
At the same time, such an approach may not be without its disad¬
vantages, as seme coopanies have found to their cost. To illustrate the
point, one manufaeturer of marine equipment, though doing fairly well in
Europe, is encountering tough coD^etition from a Gertiaa company, which it
had helped to grew with patent exchanges and a licensing agreement several
years ago. Indeed, "many companies that would new like to move abroad are
locked out of certain covintrles by exclusive licensing agreements that
2
seemed wise, low-risk, profitable decisions just a few years ago."
The random approach, generally "one shot" in character, is essentially
a decision of moving into a given country at any one time on virtttally chance
factors. These chance factors may be of any kind, such as a visit of a top
company official to the country in question, regardless of whether the
con^jany had any previous experience in the country or with it. In this
case, the Aoierlcan executive is interested in seizing the opporttmil^ that
he diacehns^/’having come to identify the opportunity on some basis or
another. There is no planned approach whatsoever. To what extent have
the American con^anies been moving abroad in such random manner? McDonald,
the author quoted earlier, says this in answers
An increasing number of coopanies have gone abroad recently in
response to just such random opportruiltles....Dozens of companies
that are now snccessfolly established overseas virtually tumbled





Eoviever, successful though these con^^anles may be, the inherent
risks in this kind of approach to overseas operations are numerous* Indeed
the author himself can give an account of unhappy experiences of many other
conpanies stumbling into foreign operations in such a manner. The fatal
drawback is the absence of any systematic analysis of projects and their
evaluation in terms of alternatives*
In this respect, the third line ef approach — country-by-country —
is far superior, inasmuch as it conten^lates analyzing carefully the feas¬
ibility of manufacturing in a specified country. Basically, this involves
four steps taken in the order listed: (l) an academic market study and
rough rtile ef thumb "guesstimates" on cost and profitability with reference
to the project in the foreign country — generally undertaken at the home
office of the American coopany; (2) if the investment looks profitable, a
kind of "first approximation" of feasibility report is made, generally com¬
prised of an on-the-spot market investigation together with compilation of
answers to questionnaires supplied by the financial and manufacturing expert¬
ise of the U.S. conpanyj (3) final on-the-spot confirmation study by a small
task force, including in it soote senior members of the conptmy's management
team, resulting in a "second and final approximation" report with a view to
actual Investment,postponement or rejection of the project; and (4) a long¬
term, post-mortem analysis of actual results, which are compared with esti¬
mated results with a feedback to improve the original rule of thumb technique.
This approach is an extended investigation involving budget appropria¬
tion in terms of time, money and men, inasmuch as the investigation ranges
from a first quick look to minute feasibility study. This Igrpe of approach —
a study of key information at home followed by on-the-spot investigation of
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special factors in the target c©untr7 — is becoming common. It is useful
and reasonably scientific. Unfortunately, decision-making in this manner
may be critically behind the times, inasmuch as the foreign markets are
undergoing drastic changes la these times. Besides, however optimal such
decisions vis-a-vis a particular country. It might still be fatal in view of
the capabilities and economic trends in other countries. Moreover, the
best operational decision in a country does not necessarily result in the
best decision for the area as a whole. To give an exao^le, taken indivi¬
dually, It may be sensible to build plants in Italy, Germany France,
but, ever the long-term, a better solution might be to build one large plant.
Finally, we come to the global approach or, more aptly, global
planning. Quite a few big companies are resorting to this to minimize the
risk of moving abroad. This is a kind of total commitment to developing
operations in all the major areas of the world and presumes indoctrination
of all members of corporate management in global thinking and principles of
a world enterprise. Acccerdlngly, there is created a top functional
position — a selebt senior esracutive or a oommlttee-— to formulate the
coiqjany's worldwide policies and strategic plans of development abroad.
What Is dven more is that all types of business activities abroad, such as
licensing or joint ventures, are either placed on a moratorium or made sub¬
servient to the basic planning. This is because such a conqpany would
try to avoid creating hurdles in the way of Its global development.
In practice, such planning starts with setting up long-range ob¬
jectives and a long-term strategy before moving abroad so that all Interim
moves can be coordinated. It also eiq>hasizes area as distinct from country
approach, investigating a whole area so that action may be taken in as many
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countries vlthln It as desired, and so that an integration of the country-
wise activities can be achieved with a Binimum of expensive and overlapping
duplication, either iomediately or at a later date. It is obvious that
statutory plans are developed ahead of time and on an area basis enabling
countzy-by-countzy decisions to be made within a larger frame.
The merit of this new approach is obvious. The overall long-term
planning, the depth analysis of feasibility of country-wise projects,
integrating such projects to mutual advantage, phasing rationally the im¬
plementation of different projects, operating the enterprises in different
countries on a principle of mutual interdependence and/or collectivity as
may be possible, and, finally, pinpointed top management functional respon¬
sibility for them all, must obviously tend to minimize the risks of moving
abroad. It is no wonder that the global approach has provided the essential
key to facilitate long-range planning in the internationalization of
American business. At the same time, like any other technique, it may bo
mentioned here that the global approach may well be misapplied in practice.
For there is no magic fezmnila for successful global planning and there are
cases of con^tanies which have paid heavily for being superficially or
hastily resozdiing to it.
Considerations in Foreign Investment
So far the discussion has revolved around motivations for going
into business abroad, the risk involved in such moves and management ap¬
proaches to minimizing the risks of operations overseas. The discussion
has also touched what has come to be called Identification and feasibility
of projects. All these may well be considered as constituting the
”environmsnt of decision-making." What, then, of the decision-making
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itself? Mere precisely, are the specific factors that must enter into
actual decision-making when setting up an operation abroad — in a particu¬
lar foreign country, to be exact?
Since setting up an enterprise abroad is essentially a capital in¬
vestment decision, it may seem that the factors cannot be any different ffom
what must be taken into account in capital investment decision at home.
This overlooks the differences in the nature of operations — at home and
abroad. It may be stated immediately, therefore, that decision-making on
capital investment abroad requires:
...consideration of all the factors that are relevant when a
domestic investment decision is made, plus other factors which can
be taken for granted in the United States, where the existence of
a satisfactory climate for business, of legal protection, of adequate
transportation facilities, and of electric power can be assumed or
will require at most superficial examination. In many parts of the
world all of these questions must be fully examined.^
What, then, are these plus factors that Robert Theobold has in mind?
Drawing upon the e:q)erlence of the U.S. businesses abroad, and taking into
accotint the unique featiures of international operation, and also what the
foregoing quotation would suggest — a check list of the major factors
would appear to be: (l) the attitude of the government of the host country;
(2) the political stability and economoc growth of the host country; (3)
the availability of trained personnel in the host country; (4) the security
of investment; (5) the problem of ownership; and (6) the remittance faci¬
lities. .
Consideration of Decisional Factors
What is the nature and scope of these considerations? How and why
are they relevant for the decision on capital investment in a foreign country?
^ Robert Theobold. Profit Potential in the Developing Countries (American
Management Association, New York, I962) an AMA research study, p.l4*
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We will turn now to a "brief consideration of these factors in order to
throw light on these questions.
1. The Attitude of the Host GoveraDaent: No business in any country today
can function without govexntnental regulations, directly ©r indirectly.
The U.S.business setting up its operations in another countiy must carefully
evaluate, therefore, the governmental environment, more specifically, its
attitude to private enterprise, to private foreign enterprise in particular.
As a minimum, the foreign investment must be recognized by the government
of the host country, otherwise there will be no security of such investment
against expropriation or confiscation and repatriation. The investment
decision in a foreign country should be largely influenced, therefore, by
the attitude of the host government, i.e.. the assurance of safe operation
without any Intervention. Commenting in this reject, Wltham, the ireasurer
of International Business Machines (IBM) sayst
A government’s attitude concerning private foreign investment is
extremely iiipertant. One of the first things a coo^any should
consider is whether the host government will recognize the invest¬
ment and that it is dollar investment.1
Related to such recognition is the attitude of the government with
regard to io^jort restrictions, for on this would depend the availability
of foreign exchange which may determine the level of the con5)any’s opera¬
tions. It is needless to state that the company’s need for iu^jorting
machinery and other equipment for Improvement or modejmization for taking
advantage of lower cost or production is directly dependent on the foreign
exchange resources. Viewing the problem from the standpoint of the
foreign country itself, it may be mentioned that if it is interested in
attracting foreign capital within its borders, it must provide the appro-
^
financing International Pijerations (New York: American Management
Association, 1965), p.l4»
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priate climate fer It. Oa this, this is what the special jolat committee
ef the League of Nations had to say:
countries which desire to attract foreign capital and skill must
make it clear that they will conform with the recognized principles
ef international comity in dealing with the foreigners...
and that
...nothing is more likely to render the foreign investor reluctant
to venture his capital than apprehension that a government may
conteB5)late expropriating private property or enterprise or
forcing the foreigners to transfer their assets or their business
to nationals.
2. Political Stability and Economic Growth of the Host Countxy. One basic
consideration for a foreign investor is the political and economic conditions
obtaining in the host country and their likely trend. What exactly should
be the perspective of the U.S. business going overseas?
The question can be answered in the words of the top management of
Standard Vaccum Oil, a con^jany which has subsidiaries in most ©f the
countries abroad:
^en a company is looking around for a place to invest fresh
capital...it wants to feel assured that the government is stable,
the economy is sound. It wants to feel confident of the integrity
and basic fairness of the people who make and apply the rules under
which the enterinrise must live....it is that indefinable element
which forms the basis of considered opinion that the country in
question is a safe place in which to invest as coo^ared with other
countries where the same capital might be usefully employed.^
This is one facet of the appraisal and/or perspectives involved in
taking decision on investment abroad. The other facet ef the same per¬
spective is fundamentally economic and consists in properly appraising the
growth potential in the host country, inasmuch as the successful or pfofit-
able operation would depend much on such growth. Perhaps related to this
^ Quoted from the speeches of the president of Stanvac.
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Is resoTirces availability, presently and looking ahead. On this economic
appraisal, Theobold has this to say:
The rate of growth of an econotqy is one of the most important
deterodnants of probable profitability of investment. A rapid
growth rate will normally Insure an overall rising demand which
will lead in turn to a continuing increase in overall sales and
usually in profits. There are two useful indicators of progress
in this eurea: fixed capital formation as a percentage of Gross
National Product, and the rate of Increase in Income and per
capita income in the country.^
3. Availability of Trained Personnel. Yet another consideration that a
company should take into account is the availability of trained personnel.
On this would depend operational efficiency of the proposed enterprise.
On what the field appriasal reveals in this respect would depend how much
training the new enterprise may have to take on Itself to ensure regular
supply of well’-quallfled personnel to man its operations over the long
horizon. It need heurdly be mentioned that the point made here is a^must"
for two reasons. One is that the host country would always ask that its
nationals be involved in the various stages of the coo^jany's operations,
at least on the long pull. The other is that even otherwise, exporting
of personnel from the United States may make the operation very costly.
On the relevance of this perspective in decision-making on foreign invest¬
ment, the treasurer of IBM says:
Since IBM World Trade is engaged in a technical business, even our
sedesmen have to be rather highly skilled technicians. Thus we
have constantly faced the problem of developing qualified personnel.
But we have yet to find a country vhere indigenous personnel cannot
be trained and brought up to a highly skilled level.^
4, Security of Investment. This is characteristic of decision-making on
international investment. Indeed, the point has come to constitute an
important part of the policy of countries interested in internal business
^
Theobold, op.cit., p.55.
2 Financing ibiternational Operation, ou.cit.. p.l6.
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development — either in attracting it or in encouraging it to go abroad.
This aspect is as ia^ortant as the general conditions of the countiy discussed
earlier — it is, in fact, highly predicated on the latter.
What exactly is this search for security? This may be beat stated in
the words of the president of Stanvac, who considers the problem in relation
to AmericEui Investment in Asian countries:
Security means many things to the potential investor. The Investor
looks for the assurance that the government is politically stable
and is moderate and consistent, or, at least, not erratic and extreme.
Security also includes reasonable assurance that the conditions
existing at the time the investment was undertaken will not be
altered t6 the disadvantage of the investor...he has (no) reason
to feel that the rules of the game are likely to be changed after
the play has started.... Security means a demonstrated record of the
continuing validity of contracts and the legal guarantee to sotmd
titles where real property is involved. It means the unlikelihood
of violent internal disturbances.
So we all recognize throughout the countries of the world there are
varying degrees of security.
The foreign investor, in other words, wants a sense of security for
his investment, which is nothing but a kind of assurance that the investment
will not be subjected to risks, other than the normal ones in operating the
business in the host country. Generally speaking, this may be stated as
treatment of foreign investment on a par with the business investments of
the nationals of the countiy. In practice, when the socio-economic climate
is changing erratically and/or where fears of nationalization of private
enterprise is writ large on the economic horizon, the Investor my not
rely on his own sense of security but seek express guarantee either from
the home or host government, or both.
5.Problem of Ownership. Apart from the considerations of general conditions,
profit potentiality, operating considerations and the security of investment.
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the foreign investor must also consider the question of ownership of the
proposed enterprise, inasmuch as managerial control is generally based on
this* In the case of the business at home, the managerial control is de
facte in the hands of the hands of the managerial team — ownership is
very much •’absentee," so to speak. In international operation, this need
not be so inasmuch as participation in the ownership of the enterprise by
the nationals of the host country would invariably lead to sharing of
control, unless otherwise e^qjressly provided for. This is so because one of
the motives of the host government asking for ownership participation ly
its nations is Just this, ie.. share in the control of the enterprise.
Apart from the control factor, the ownership consideration assumes import¬
ance for another reason, which is that, the operating management has to
render final accounts to the ownership group, an obligation that the U.S.
operating manageoffint may find irksome.in dealing with foreign owners and
having to share higher earnings of equity ownership without them (owners in
the host country). However, three forms of ownership are usually preva¬
lent in foreign operations. They are: (l) 100 percent ownership, where
the investor keeps the full control of the operation and management} (2)
50:50 ownership, where the foreign investor and the investor er investors
of the host country hold equal rights to participate in control, operation,
and management of the business} and lastly (3) the minority interest, where¬
in th^ foreign investor holds no right to control, or direct the operation
of the business.
What may really pose the problem of ownership la practice? This may
be briefly answered by quoting from E, R. Barlow, as follows:
Some governments, such as India, have Indicated clearly that U.S.
companies are only welcome if they are willing to permit local
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capital participatioB* Although it is still permissible to own
companies 100 percent in Mexico, the statement in Law that the
government may requir 51 percent local ownership presents an ever¬
present warning that the government may sometime in the future
elect to prohibit the formation of new companies on 100 percent
U.S, ownership basis. Similar threats exist in many other
countries.^
Leaving aside the conpelling circumstances just mentioned, what of
the preferences and practices of the American businesses? The question may
be answered by giving the findings of a sample study as shown in Table
10(a). Also shown in Table 10(b) is a finer breakdown of ownership
pattern — the 84 foreign affiliates of the same 72 U.S. corporations in
terms of ownership of voting stock and debts of these affiliates abroad.
6. Remittance Facilities. Remittance facilities is a peculiar considera¬
tion in international operations. The intention of investing abroad is
not merely to earn profit but’ also to be able to bring the earnings home
as needed. The rationale of the remittance facilities may be expressed in
the words of the president of Stanvac, thus:
The flow of investment is stimulated when the investor can remit
his earnings in the currency of origin, for.... that is the only
currency in which ■yie individual shareholder wants to receive his
dividend check.
The same thing goes for the investor being able to repatriate his
initial capital, in the form of depreciation, over a reasonable
period of time. Funds are required to replace worn-out and obsolete
equipment, and in many oases the materials required for this purpose
can be procured only in the United States smd Europe. Consequently,
it is inportant that depreciation be remittable in the cvtrrency of
origin to help meet these requirements as they arise. The privi¬
lege of repittances is not for the pwpose of realizing quick
profits and liquidating the business....There are few companies which
make sizeable conmitments abroad with this objective in mind. An
industrial plant is an asset...which constantly needs replacing, and
should be treated as such.
Remittance of earnings in foreign currency mainly depends on the
^ E. R. Barlow, Management of Foreign Manufacturing Subsidiaries
(Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1953), p.l20.
TABLE 10(a)
PREFERENCE AND PRACTICE AS TO OWNERSHIP OP FOREIGN COMPANIES,








100 percent Ownership 47 38
Over 50 percent 14 23
50:50 1 1
Less than 50 percent 3 3
No preference or predominant pattern 7 7
Total Companies 72 72
Source: University of Oregon Foreign Investment Questionnaire.
TABLE 10(b)
DISTRIBUTION OF 84 FOREIGN AFFILIATES OF 72 U.S. CORPOR¬





Percentage of Voting Stock





No debt (or none owned)" 3 0 4 19 26
None owned 1 3 7 19 30




Total Number of Foreign Compan-
les 6 7 16 55 84
Source: University of Oregon Foreign Investment Questionnaire*
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eamiugs of foreign exchange by the host country. It is here that it
becomes an issue for the U.S. business overseas. In addition to the short¬
age of dollars at their disposal, the underdeveloped countries operate
on the policy of conserving foreign exchange for use according to the prior¬
ities in their program of economic development, whence the dollar shortage
for these countries and the remittance, problem for the foreign business in
those countries.
To sum up the discussioni There are quite a few strategic factors
relative to decision on capital investment abroad; varied as they may seem,
they revolve around two basics of the situation — that setting up an enter¬
prise requires large long-term commitment of funds, to be recovered only
through business turnover, and that such commitment takes place in a foreign
socio-economic environment — coB^jrehending in it the problems of national
currencies, international exchange and different governmental regulation
and control of business: and, were it not for the foreignness — differences,
in other words, — in respect of social environment, economic and educational
attainment, cultural perspectives, political order and currencies — and
the reality of soverign nation states — were it not for these, many of the
factors considered here would cease to be strategic decisional factors —
in other words, were the multiplicity of nation states to be replaced by





A growing number of Atnsricein coii5)anie3 are spreading their wings
abroad. The roster includes not just small-and mediuo^slze manufacturing
companies, but some of the largest and most powerful firms in the country.
The growth is evident not merely in the increasing amovint of outstanding
direct foreign investment from year to year but in yet another manner —
namely, the proportion of the total earnings of some of the corporations
that come from overseas operations. Girding itself for a massive foreign
manufacturing foray, General Electric expects that, by 1970, some 50 percait
of its total earnings will come from overseas operations. DuPont, once
extremely insuleir in its operations, how has production units in Holland,
Belgium, and Northern Ireland. Campbell Soup is trying to capture a major
share of the growing European market. IBM World Trade is growing faster
than its ebullient U.S. parent. For the National Cash Register nearly
40 percent of the income of the corporate family comes from abroad.
Looking over the Past
Increased by this development, the study has made an attempt to
delineate the overall growth of the U.S. ventures abroad in our times, the
developing governmental role in this context, and some of the managerial
perspectives behind the emerging pattern. Looking over the achievements
of the U.S. business abroad it may well be asked: How has this growth actually
been achieved? Where have the fvinds for growth come from? How have they
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act\ially been applied? What have been the iti^jllcations of the sources and
vises of funds in evidence of the spectacvilar development of the U.S, busi¬
ness abroad? What inqiact have the U.S. businesses abroad been making in
the different host countries?
In reply, a few tentative observations may well be made.. Firstly,
the data in Tables 11(a) and 11(b) giving the sources and uses of funds
relative to the U.S. overseas direct investment activity for the period
1961-1963, provide a quick glimpse of the financial aspects of the develop¬
ment of the country's international operations. These tables show data
with reference to major geographic areas and industrial segments.
Secondly, concerning the implications of the overseas developments for
the economy of the United States, two points may be made. One is that some
comapnies have bean harassed in their domestic markets ty low cost goods produce
abroad by their U.S. rivals. In 1957, goods in this categoiy in the amount of
nearly #1 billion came into the country. It is clear then that a great part
of the moves overseas could be e3q}lained as a "necessity” for existence even
in the home market. Yet as this development spreads, it obviously raises
the problem of the employment opportunities at home that are exported with
the setting up of enterprises abroad. Indeed, many observers of the country’s
economic scene are e:q)ressing alarm at this development.
The other is the problem consequent on the export of funds from the
United States to finance the growth of operations abroad. This is the pro¬
blem of balance of payments that the country is presently anxious about.
Over the period I96I-I963, while net income abroad provided a largo part
of the funds for growth, funds from the United States increased some 50 per¬
cent — from about one billion dollars to one billion and one half. In the
TABLE 11(a)







1963^ .1964 1962 1963 . 1964 1962
All areas, total 8,806 10,397 11,852 3,877 4,262 4,772 1,021
Mining and smelting 906 875 1,044 494 493 679 98
Petroleum 3,765 4,642 4,452 1,824 1,953 1,980 340
Memufacturing 4,135 4,880 6,356 1,559 1,816 2,113 583
Canada, total 2,106 2,338 2,557 905 1,055 1,244 201
Mining and smelting 389 347 499 179 187 318 95
Petroleum 570 743 618 190 245 259 77
Manufacturing 1,U7 1,248 1,440 527 623 667 29
Latin America, total^ 1,801 1,909 2,2a 1,016 980 1,123 -21
Mining and smelting 329 364 337 246 234 278 -28
Petroleum 854 886 858 567 545 559 -147
Manufacturing 618 659 1,046 203 201 286 154
Europe, total 2,540 3,300 3,803 679 802 881 557
Mining suid smelting 9 12 10 5 4 3 7
Petroleum 747 1,068 943 74 69 8 255
Manufacturing 1,784 2,220 2,850 600 729 870 299
Other areas, total 2,359 2,850 3,251 1,277 1,425 1,524 284
Mining and smelting 179 152 198 64 68 80 28
Petroleum 1,594 1,945 2,033 984 1,D94 1,154 155
Manufacturing 586 753 1,020 229 263 290 101
Source: Surrey of Current Business.
* Less than $500,000
r Revised
1 Includes miscellaneous sources




Fuads obtaiasd Depreciatloa aad
^Ited States abroad^ denletloa
a—1262 1264 1962 1963 1964 1962 1963 1964
1,393 1,456 1,546 2,152 2,677 2,362 2,590 2,947
41 -41 107 102 149 207 239 257
m 735 506 777 598 1,095 1,123 1,139
563 762 933 1,273 1,930 1,060 1,228 1,551
192 126 320 332 423 680 759 764
-24 U 15 70 51 100 114 116
148 38 84 100 119 210 250 202
68 74 221 162 253 370 395 U6
206 20 225 146 490 581 577 608
U -72 31 15 33 80 101 98
34 -63 44 -44 32 390 351 330
158 155 150 175 425 lU 125 180
577 765 608 1,111 1,167 696 810 990
7 2 « -1 * 1 2 5
331 380 198 431 305 220 237 250
239 383 410 681 862 475 571 735
418 545 393 563 597 405 444 585
44 15 61 18 65 26 22 38
276 380 180 290 142 275 285 ? 357
98 150 152 255 390 104 137 190
TABLE 11 (b)
USES OF FUNDS
U.S. BUSINESS OPERATIONS OVERSEAS
Property, plant
Area and Industry Total Uses and equlpinsnt _____
, 1962r ;964 1962 1262 1964 1962
All areas, total 8,806 10,397 11,952 4,108 4,538 5,469 655
Mining and smelting 906 875 1,044 438 398 420 45
Petroleum 3,765 4,642 4,452 1,628 1,889 2,066 54
Manufacturing 4,135 4,880 6,356 2,042 2,251 2,983 556
Canada, total 2,106 2,338 2,557 1,003 1,105 1,374 215
Mining and smelting 389 347 499 245 195 220 20
Petroleum 570 743 618 300 375 385 5
Manufacturing 1,147 1,248 1,440 458 535 768 190
Latin America, total^ 1,801 1,909 2,241 720 724 855 75
Mining and smelting 329 364 337 95 109 126 5
Petroleum 854 886 858 339 307 327 -25
Manufacturing 618 659 1,046 286 308 402 95
Europe, total 2,540 3,300 3,803 1,522 1,754 1,939 252
Mining and smelting 9 12 10 4 5 3
Petroleum 747 1,068 943 494 642 643 49
Manufacturing 1,784 2,220 2,850 1,024 1,107 1,293 203
Other areas, total 2,359 2,850 3,251 863 955 1,301 113
Mining and smelting 170 152 198 94 89 71 20
Petroleum 1,594 1,945 2,033 495 565 711 25
Manufacturing 586 753 1,020 274 301 519 68
Source: Survey of Current Business
* Less than |500,000
t Revised
1 Includes miseellaneMs sources
2 Includes "ether Western Hemisphere."




/ ~ ■" —
aventories Receivables 0thei''A33etg3 - ^Income paid Out
1963 1964 1962 1963 . 1964 .1962. . . 1963 1964 1962 1963 1964
"744 1,240 740 1,218 1,096 539 1,136 738 2,764 2,761 3,309
"
-3 6 42 45 72 58 81 152 323 354 394
►119 101 296 439 233 221 498 79 1,566 1,697 1,973
628 1,133 402 734 791 260 557 507 875 710 942
^122 230 175 293 164 208 407 189 505 ai 600
^-12 -20 * 19 39 26 60 96 98 85 164
24 5 45 59 50 72 167 20 148 118 158
►110 245 130 215 75 110 180 73 259 208 278
'135 191 96 108 310 180 92 160 730 850 725
5 9 25 10 10 34 16 22 170 224 170
15 -13 5 10 70 60 1 U 475 553 460
^^115 195 66 88 230 86 75 124 85 73 95
342 557 228 496 394 80 307 400 458 401 513
^
-1 1 2 1 2 -2 « 5 7 4
< 60 65 76 U5 30 60 155 150 68 66 55
283
-i
491 150 350 362 22 152 250 385 328 454
"U5 262 2a 321 228 71 330 -11 1,071 1,099 1,471
. 5 16 15 15 21 5 34 50 38 56
20 44 170 '225 83 29 1175 *105 875 960 1,300
^120 202 56 81 124 42 150 60 146 101 115
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feurth quarter of 1964j private capital outflows surged to over |2
blllioB. Though the balance of payments has been aggravated by other
factors also — such as foreign aid and the Vietnam War e^enditure —
the federal government since the beginning of 1965 has been seriously con¬
cerned with this capital outflow. Indeed, in February, 1965, President
Johnson announced a ten-point voluntary program to ease the pressure on
the country's balance of payments. The main feature of the program that
concerns us here is what he urged private industry to do to help the situa¬
tion. On March 12, 1965, after consulting an advisory committee corqjosed
of distinguished businessmen of the country, the Secretary of Commerce sent
letters to 600 American cotipanies doing substantial overseas business evez^
seas urging them to cut down their projected capital investment by 15 to 20
percent. The program was declared to be entirely voluntary, and each
company was asked to make an extraordinary effort in the light of its own
circumstances. On June 4, 1965, a similar request went out to another 3,000.
coB^anies. He also wrote to 100 firms with substantial foreign ownership
to persuade them to avoid Increasing their U.S. borrowings for abroad.
As of July 30, 1965, well over 40 cou^janies had voluntarily postponed or
cancelled the Investment projects in developed countries that they had planned
to carry out in 1965. What is more, some 20 percent of the reporting
companies said that they proposed to finance their projects by raising funds
locally so as to reduce the premium on dollars, even though it meant added
costs.
In passing, it is interesting to note specifically that the voluntary
program for TJ.S. business was intended to curb capital investment in developed
countries. The less-developed countries were expressly excluded from the
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program. The reason was obvious. "This reflects the national objective
of spurring increased private participation in the development and growth of
the economies of the less-developed countries — in part to replace U.S,
government assistance program,"^
As for the io^ct that the development of U.S, business abroad is
making on the economies of the host countries, there is hardly any ceD5)re-
hensive data available to formulate even a tentative answer. However,
it is interesting to mention that in 1957, U.S. firms abroad paid wages
and salaries of nearly |7 billion, spent about $17 billion for materials
and services, and es^loyed about 3 million people. It is also Interesting
to press the point that, almost Invariably, foreign investment obtains entry
into a country only with the consent of Ihe coUtoJry concerned. Accordingly,
it may be taken for granted that the U.S. private investments in foreign
countries must be finding entry only in the strategic areas of the economies
of these countries. To that extent, there is a presun5)tion that the role
of the U.S. business has been beneficial for these countries.
Let there be no mistake. The aforesaid observations are far from
being exhaustive. In fact, what has been said may well be considered as
tentative — hypotheses that should be subjected to careful verification
and intensive research.
So far we have raised a few questions by looking back on the broad
developments that constituted the subject matter of this study.
Looking Ahead
What may we envision looking ahead? Peering into the future, this
is what John J. Beauvois says:
^ American Management Association, Management Bulletin No,68. p.l4*
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Within the next ten or fifteen years the physiogenooiy of AEaerlcan
business is likely to change draioatieally as a large number of American
companies emerge, by choice or by necessity, as international enter¬
prises. Barring a world war, this change appears inevitable in the
light of current trends. Indeed it is confirmed by unmistakable
precursory signs....
Even more significant, perhaps, a large number of now purely domestic
companies will move into the international field for defensive, if not
offensive, reasons.^
If such is the portent of the times, what about the capabilities of
the generation of top management in handling their management responsibilities?
The question is important for two reasons. One is that evidently the exe¬
cutives of the international enterprises will come, for the most post, from
the domestic operations of today and/or perhaps from the country’s schools
of business and universities. The second is, as President Johnson said
in the 51st National Foreign Trade Dinner Convention in 1964, that "Each
business firm engaged in international commerce is, in a very real sense,
a merchant of peace." All in all, if the trend of international business
of the foremost industrial country is to consummate in global economic
welfare, the upcoming executives must equip themselves with international
skills.
If what has been said is agreed to, this study may well close by
posing two basic challenges:
(1) Will the future executives coming up the ladder through domestic
operations be prepared to assume international responsibilities?
(2) Will the business school student of today be trained to think and
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